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1Northoff, G.: ¬The spontaneous brain : from the mind-body to the world-brain problem.
Cambridge, MA : MIT Press, 2018. xxvi, 506 S.
Abstract: Philosophers have long debated the mind-body problem whether to attribute such mental features as consciousness to mind or to body. Meanwhile, neuroscientists search for empirical answers, seeking neural correlates for consciousness, self, and free will. In this book, Georg Northoff does not propose new solutions to the mind-body problem; instead, he questions the problem itself, arguing that it is an empirically, ontologically, and conceptually implausible way to address the existence and reality of mental features. We are better off, he contends, by addressing consciousness and other mental features in terms of the relationship between world and brain; philosophers should consider the world-brain problem rather than the mind-body problem. This calls for a Copernican shift in vantage point from within the mind or brain to beyond the brain in our consideration of mental features. Northoff, a neuroscientist, psychiatrist, and philosopher, explains that empirical evidence suggests that the brain's spontaneous activity and its spatiotemporal structure are central to aligning and integrating the brain within the world. This spatiotemporal structure allows the brain to extend beyond itself into body and world, creating the world-brain relation? that is central to mental features. Northoff makes his argument in empirical, ontological, and epistemic-methodological terms. He discusses current models of the brain and applies these models to recent data on neuronal features underlying consciousness and proposes the world-brain relation as the ontological predisposition for consciousness.
Anmerkung: Vgl. das Interview mit L. Stallmach 'Wie das Bewusstsein in Raum und Zeit entsteht' unter: https://www.nzz.ch/wissenschaft/georg-northoff-die-theorie-des-bewusstseins-ld.1512587?utm_source=pocket-newtab [Georg-Northoff_DieTheoriedesBewusstseins_NZZ.pdf].
LCSH: Brain / Physiology ; Mind and body ; Neurosciences / Philosophy
RSWK: Kognition / Hirnforschung / Spontaneität
BK: 77.31 (Kognition)
DDC: 612.8/2 / dc23
RVK: XG 8800 - Allgemeines / Medizin / Pathologie
2Koch, C.: Consciousness : confessions of a romantic reductionist.
Cambridge, Massachusetts : MIT Press, 2012. xii, 181 S.
Abstract: What links conscious experience of pain, joy, color, and smell to bioelectrical activity in the brain? How can anything physical give rise to nonphysical, subjective, conscious states? Christof Koch has devoted much of his career to bridging the seemingly unbridgeable gap between the physics of the brain and phenomenal experience. This engaging book?part scientific overview, part memoir, part futurist speculation?describes Koch's search for an empirical explanation for consciousness. Koch recounts not only the birth of the modern science of consciousness but also the subterranean motivation for his quest?his instinctual (if "romantic") belief that life is meaningful. Koch describes his own groundbreaking work with Francis Crick in the 1990s and 2000s and the gradual emergence of consciousness (once considered a "fringy" subject) as a legitimate topic for scientific investigation. Present at this paradigm shift were Koch and a handful of colleagues, including Ned Block, David Chalmers, Stanislas Dehaene, Giulio Tononi, Wolf Singer, and others. Aiding and abetting it were new techniques to listen in on the activity of individual nerve cells, clinical studies, and brain-imaging technologies that allowed safe and noninvasive study of the human brain in action. Koch gives us stories from the front lines of modern research into the neurobiology of consciousness as well as his own reflections on a variety of topics, including the distinction between attention and awareness, the unconscious, how neurons respond to Homer Simpson, the physics and biology of free will, dogs, Der Ring des Nibelungen, sentient machines, the loss of his belief in a personal God, and sadness. All of them are signposts in the pursuit of his life's work?to uncover the roots of consciousness
Inhalt: In which I introduce the ancient mind-body problem, explain why I am on a quest to use reason and empirical inquiry to solve it, acquaint you with Francis Crick, explain how he relates to this quest, make a confession, and end on a sad note -- In which I write about the wellsprings of my inner conflict between religion and reason, why I grew up wanting to be a scientist, why I wear a lapel pin of Professor Calculus, and how I acquired a second mentor late in life -- In which I explain why consciousness challenges the scientific view of the world, how consciousness can be investigated empirically with both feet firmly planted on the ground, why animals share consciousness with humans, and why self-consciousness is not as important as many people think it is -- In which you hear tales of scientist-magicians that make you look but not see, how they track the footprints of consciousness by peering into your skull, why you don't see with your eyes, and why attention and consciousness are not the same -- In which you learn from neurologists and neurosurgeons that some neurons care a great deal about celebrities, that cutting the cerebral cortex in two does not reduce consciousness by half, that color is leached from the world by the loss of a small cortical region, and that the destruction of a sugar cube-sized chunk of brain stem or thalamic tissue leaves you undead -- In which I defend two propositions that my younger self found nonsense--you are unaware of most of the things that go on in your head, and zombie agents control much of your life, even though you confidently believe that you are in charge -- In which I throw caution to the wind, bring up free will, Der ring des Nibelungen, and what physics says about determinism, explain the impoverished ability of your mind to choose, show that your will lags behind your brain's decision, and that freedom is just another word for feeling -- In which I argue that consciousness is a fundamental property of complex things, rhapsodize about integrated information theory, how it explains many puzzling facts about consciousness and provides a blueprint for building sentient machines -- In which I outline an electromagnetic gadget to measure consciousness, describe efforts to harness the power of genetic engineering to track consciousness in mice, and find myself building cortical observatories -- In which I muse about final matters considered off-limits to polite scientific discourse: to wit, the relationship between science and religion, the existence of God, whether this God can intervene in the universe, the death of my mentor, and my recent tribulations.
Anmerkung: Rez. in: The New York Review of Books, 10.01.2013 ( J. Searle): "The problem of consciousness remains with us. What exactly is it and why is it still with us? The single most important question is: How exactly do neurobiological processes in the brain cause human and animal consciousness? Related problems are: How exactly is consciousness realized in the brain? That is, where is it and how does it exist in the brain? Also, how does it function causally in our behavior? To answer these questions we have to ask: What is it? Without attempting an elaborate definition, we can say the central feature of consciousness is that for any conscious state there is something that it feels like to be in that state, some qualitative character to the state. For example, the qualitative character of drinking beer is different from that of listening to music or thinking about your income tax. This qualitative character is subjective in that it only exists as experienced by a human or animal subject. It has a subjective or first-person existence (or "ontology"), unlike mountains, molecules, and tectonic plates that have an objective or third-person existence. Furthermore, qualitative subjectivity always comes to us as part of a unified conscious field. At any moment you do not just experience the sound of the music and the taste of the beer, but you have both as part of a single, unified conscious field, a subjective awareness of the total conscious experience. So the feature we are trying to explain is qualitative, unified subjectivity. ; Now it might seem that is a fairly well-defined scientific task: just figure out how the brain does it. In the end I think that is the right attitude to have. But our peculiar history makes it difficult to have exactly that attitude-to take consciousness as a biological phenomenon like digestion or photosynthesis, and figure out how exactly it works as a biological phenomenon. Two philosophical obstacles cast a shadow over the whole subject. The first is the tradition of God, the soul, and immortality. Consciousness is not a part of the ordinary biological world of digestion and photosynthesis: it is part of a spiritual world. It is sometimes thought to be a property of the soul and the soul is definitely not a part of the physical world. The other tradition, almost as misleading, is a certain conception of Science with a capital "S." Science is said to be "reductionist" and "materialist," and so construed there is no room for consciousness in Science. If it really exists, consciousness must really be something else. It must be reducible to something else, such as neuron firings, computer programs running in the brain, or dispositions to behavior. There are also a number of purely technical difficulties to neurobiological research. The brain is an extremely complicated mechanism with about a hundred billion neurons in ... (Rest nicht frei). " [https://www.nybooks.com/articles/2013/01/10/can-information-theory-explain-consciousness/]. ; Erwiderung von C. Koch u. G. Tononi in: The New York Review of Books, 07.03.2013 [https://www.nybooks.com/articles/2013/03/07/can-photodiode-be-conscious/?pagination=false&printpage=true] mit einer weiteren Erwiderung von J. Searle.
LCSH: Consciousness ; Mind and body ; Free will and determinism ; Life ; Personal Autonomy ; Existentialism
RSWK: Bewusstsein / Willensfreiheit / Leib-Seele-Problem / Neurowissenschaftler / Erlebnisbericht 1990-2010 ; Koch, Christof / Autobiographie 1990-2010 ; Koch, Christof *1956-* / Bewusstsein / Willensfreiheit / Leib-Seele-Problem / Neurowissenschaften / Autobiographie
BK: 77.47 (Bewußtseinszustände) ; 08.32 (Erkenntnistheorie)
DDC: 153 / dc23
GHBS: HRC (E)
RVK: CC 5500 ; CZ 1000 ; WW 2200
3Tononi, G.: Phi : a voyage from the brain to the soul.
New York : Pantheon Books, 2012. XII, 364 S.
Abstract: From one of the most original and influential neuroscientists at work today, here is an exploration of consciousness unlike any other-as told by Galileo, who opened the way for the objectivity of science and is now intent on making subjective experience a part of science as well. Giulio Tononi is one of the most creative and the most influential neurologists in the world nowadays. Tononis way of exploring consciousness is different from those of the others, which is that his course of exploring consciousness is narrated by Galileo who used to pave the way for the objectivity of science and devoted himself to making subjective experience a part of science in the book Phi:a Voyage from the Brain to the Soul. Galileo's journey has three parts, each with a different guide. In the first, accompanied by a scientist who resembles Francis Crick, he learns why certain parts of the brain are important and not others, and why consciousness fades with sleep. In the second part, when his companion seems to be named Alturi (Galileo is hard of hearing; his companion's name is actually Alan Turing), he sees how the facts assembled in the first part can be unified and understood through a scientific theory-a theory that links consciousness to the notion of integrated information (also known as phi). In the third part, accompanied by a bearded man who can only be Charles Darwin, he meditates on how consciousness is an evolving, developing, ever-deepening awareness of ourselves in history and culture-that it is everything we have and everything we are. Not since Gödel, Escher, Bach has there been a book that interweaves science, art, and the imagination with such originality. This beautiful and arresting narrative will transform the way we think of ourselves and the world.
LCSH: Consciousness / Physiological aspects ; Brain / Physiology ; Mind and body ; Neuropsychology
RSWK: Bewusstsein / Gehirn / Physiologie / Leib-Seele-Problem
BK: 77.50 (Psychophysiologie) ; 77.47 (Bewußtseinszustände) ; 44.37 (Physiologie)
DDC: 612.8 / dc23
GHBS: TUP ; TZH
4Chalmers, D.J.: ¬The conscious mind : in search of a fundamental theory.
New York [u.a.] : Oxford Univ. Press, 1996. XVII, 414 S.
(Philosophy of mind series)
Abstract: What is consciousness? How do physical processes in the brain give rise to the self-aware mind and to feelings as profoundly varied as love or hate, aesthetic pleasure or spiritual yearning? These questions today are among the most hotly debated issues among scientists and philosophers, and we have seen in recent years superb volumes by such eminent figures as Francis Crick, Daniel C. Dennett, Gerald Edelman, and Roger Penrose, all firing volleys in what has come to be called the consciousness wars. Now, in The Conscious Mind, philosopher David J. Chalmers offers a cogent analysis of this heated debate as he unveils a major new theory of consciousness, one that rejects the prevailing reductionist trend of science, while offering provocative insights into the relationship between mind and brain. Writing in a rigorous, thought-provoking style, the author takes us on a far-reaching tour through the philosophical ramifications of consciousness. Chalmers convincingly reveals how contemporary cognitive science and neurobiology have failed to explain how and why mental events emerge from physiological occurrences in the brain. He proposes instead that conscious experience must be understood in an entirely new light--as an irreducible entity (similar to such physical properties as time, mass, and space) that exists at a fundamental level and cannot be understood as the sum of its parts. And after suggesting some intriguing possibilities about the structure and laws of conscious experience, he details how his unique reinterpretation of the mind could be the focus of a new science. Throughout the book, Chalmers provides fascinating thought experiments that trenchantly illustrate his ideas. For example, in exploring the notion that consciousness could be experienced by machines as well as humans, Chalmers asks us to imagine a thinking brain in which neurons are slowly replaced by silicon chips that precisely duplicate their functions--as the neurons are replaced, will consciousness gradually fade away? The book also features thoughtful discussions of how the author's theories might be practically applied to subjects as diverse as artificial intelligence and the interpretation of quantum mechanics.
Wissenschaftsfach: Kognitionswissenschaft ; Philosophie
LCSH: Philosophy of mind ; Consciousness ; Mind and body ; Dualism
RSWK: Philosophy of Mind ; Bewusstsein ; Geist / Bewusstsein / Leib-Seele-Problem ; Selbstbewusstsein / Philosophie
BK: 77.11 Bewußtseinspsychologie
DDC: 128/.2 / dc20
Eppelsheimer: 77.50 Psychophysiologie
GHBS: HNI (DU) ; HMZ (E) ; HLR (PB)
LCC: BD418.3.C43 1996
RVK: CC 3600 ; CC 4400 ; CC 5200 ; CC 6600
5Popper, K.R. ; Eccles, J.C.: ¬Das Ich und sein Gehirn.Von den Verf. durchges. Übers. aus den Engl. von Angela Hartung und Willy Hochkeppel. Wiss. Mitarb. bei der Übers.: Otto Creutzfeldt. 3. Aufl.
München : Piper, 1984. 699 S.
Abstract: Von der Liaison zwischen Ich und Gehirn Zwei herausragende Gelehrte des Jahrhunderts - der Philosoph Karl R. Popper und der Hirnforscher und Nobelpreisträger John C. Eccles - haben sich in diesem einmaligen Dokument kreativer Zusammenarbeit mit dem Leib-Seele-Problem beschäftigt. Sie sind damit einer zentralen Frage des menschlichen Daseins auf den Grund gegangen.
Anmerkung: Originaltitel: The self and its brain
Wissenschaftsfach: Kognitionswissenschaft ; Philosophie
LCSH: Brain ; Mind and body ; Self
RSWK: Erkenntnistheorie / Allgemeine Psychologie / Psychophysik (SBPK) ; Geist / Neurophysiologie ; Bewusstsein ; Gehirn / Seele ; Leib-Seele-Problem ; Bewusstsein / Gehirn ; Leib-Seele-Problem / Hirnforschung ; Hirnforschung / Philosophie (GBV) ; Gehirn / Hirnverletzung / Materialismus / Leib-Seele-Problem (GBV)
BK: 77.02 (Philosophie und Theorie der Psychologie) ; 77.50 (Psychophysiologie) ; 08.36 (Philosophische Anthropologie)
ASB: Lcm ; Uk
SFB: PHIL 293 ; PHIL 957 POPP ; BIO 320 ; MED 182
GHBS: HMZ (SI) ; HRC (HA) ; JNSI (W)
RVK: CI 3964 ; CP 4000 ; CZ 1000