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  • × author_ss:"Frohmann, B."
  • × year_i:[2000 TO 2010}
  1. Frohmann, B.: Revisiting "what is a document?" (2009) 0.00 
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    Abstract
    Purpose - The purpose of this paper is to provide a reconsideration of Michael Buckland's important question, "What is a document?", analysing the point and purpose of definitions of "document" and "documentation". Design/methodology/approach - Two philosophical notions of the point of definitions are contrasted: John Stuart Mill's concept of a "real" definition, purporting to specify the nature of the definiendum; and a concept of definition based upon a foundationalist philosophy of language. Both conceptions assume that a general, philosophical justification for using words as we do is always in order. This assumption is criticized by deploying Hilary Putnam's arguments against the orthodox Wittgensteinian interpretation of criteria governing the use of language. The example of the cabinets of curiosities of the sixteenth-century English and European virtuosi is developed to show how one might productively think about what documents might be, but without a definition of a document. Findings - Other than for specific, instrumentalist purposes (often appropriate for specific case studies), there is no general philosophical reason for asking, what is a document? There are good reasons for pursuing studies of documentation without the impediments of definitions of "document" or "documentation". Originality/value - The paper makes an original contribution to the new interest in documentation studies by providing conceptual resources for multiplying, rather than restricting, the areas of application of the concepts of documents and documentation.
    Type
    a
  2. Frohmann, B.: Documentation redux : prolegomenon to (another) philosophy of information (2004) 0.00 
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    Abstract
    A philosophy of information is grounded in a philosophy of documentation. Nunberg's conception of the phenomenon of information heralds a shift of attention away from the question "What is information?" toward a critical investigation of the sources and legitimation of the question itself. Analogies between Wittgenstein's deconstruction of philosophical accounts of meaning and a corresponding deconstruction of philosophical accounts of information suggest that because the informativeness of a document depends on certain kinds of practices with it, and because information emerges as an effect of such practices, documentary practices are ontologically primary to information. The informativeness of documents therefore refers us to the properties of documentary practices. These fall into four broad categories: their materiality; their institutional sites; the ways in which they are socially disciplined; and their historical contingency. Two examples from early modern science, which contrast the scholastic documentary practices of continental natural philosophers to those of their peers in Restoration England, illustrate the richness of the factors that must be taken into account to understand how documents become informing.
    Type
    a
  3. Frohmann, B.: Subjectivity and information ethics (2008) 0.00 
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    Abstract
    In A Brief History of Information Ethics, Thomas Froehlich (2004) quickly surveyed under several broad categories some of the many issues that constitute information ethics: under the category of librarianship - censorship, privacy, access, balance in collections, copyright, fair use, and codes of ethics; under information science, which Froehlich sees as closely related to librarianship - confidentiality, bias, and quality of information; under computer ethics - intellectual property, privacy, fair representation, nonmaleficence, computer crime, software reliability, artificial intelligence, and e-commerce; under cyberethics (issues related to the Internet, or cyberspace) - expert systems, artificial intelligence (again), and robotics; under media ethics - news, impartiality, journalistic ethics, deceit, lies, sexuality, censorship (again), and violence in the press; and under intercultural information ethics - digital divide, and the ethical role of the Internet for social, political, cultural, and economic development. Many of the debates in information ethics, on these and other issues, have to do with specific kinds of relationships between subjects. The most important subject and a familiar figure in information ethics is the ethical subject engaged in moral deliberation, whether appearing as the bearer of moral rights and obligations to other subjects, or as an agent whose actions are judged, whether by others or by oneself, according to the standards of various moral codes and ethical principles. Many debates in information ethics revolve around conflicts between those acting according to principles of unfettered access to information and those finding some information offensive or harmful. Subjectivity is at the heart of information ethics. But how is subjectivity understood? Can it be understood in ways that broaden ethical reflection to include problems that remain invisible when subjectivity is taken for granted and when how it is created remains unquestioned? This article proposes some answers by investigating the meaning and role of subjectivity in information ethics.[In an article on cyberethics (2000), I asserted that there was no information ethics in any special sense beyond the application of general ethical principles to information services. Here, I take a more expansive view.]
    Type
    a

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