Search (19 results, page 1 of 1)

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Abstract

Hjorland and Christensen provide an analyzed example in order to clarify their views on relevance. A physician's information seeking focus in dealing with mental illness is seen as largely determined by his social cognitive state, with complexity increasing as the individual's understanding of the topic deviates from mainstream thinking. The physician's viewpoint on the disease will influence terminology utilized, and an eclectic attitude toward the disease will result in more broad criteria of relevance. Relevance is seen as a tool toward meeting an individual goal.

Date

21. 7.2006 14:11:22

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Content

"This letter considers some main arguments in Professor Bates' article (2008), which is part of our former debate (Bates, 2005,2006; Hjoerland, 2007). Bates (2008) does not write much to restate or enlarge on her theoretical position but is mostly arguing about what she claims Hjorland (2007) ignored or misinterpreted in her two articles. Bates (2008, p. 842) wrote that my arguments did not reflect "a standard of coherence, consistency, and logic that is expected of an argument presented in a scientific journal." My argumentation below will refute this statement. This controversy is whether information should be understood as a subjective phenomenon (alone), as an objective phenomenon (alone), or as a combined objective and a subjective phenomenon ("having it both ways"). Bates (2006) defined "information" (sometimes, e.g., termed "information 1," p. 1042) as an objective phenomenon and "information 2" as a subjective phenomenon. However, sometimes the term "information" is also used as a synonym for "information 2," e.g., "the term information is understood to refer to one or both senses" (p. 1042). Thus, Professor Bates is not consistent in using the terminology that she herself introduces, and confusion in this controversy may be caused by Professor Bates' ambiguity in her use of the term "information." Bates (2006, p. 1033) defined information as an objective phenomenon by joining a definition by Edwin Parker: "Information is the pattern of organization of matter and energy." The argument in Hjoerland (2007) is, by contrast, that information should be understood as a subjective phenomenon all the way down: That neither the objective definition of information nor "having it both ways" is fruitful. This is expressed, for example, by joining Karpatschof's (2000) definition of information as a physical signal relative to a certain release mechanism, which implies that information is not something objective that can be understood independently of an observer or independently of other kinds of mechanism that are programmed to be sensitive to specific attributes of a signal: There are many differences in the world, and each of them is potentially informative in given situations. Regarding Parker's definition, "patterns of organization of matter and energy" are no more than that until they inform somebody about something. When they inform somebody about something, they may be considered information. The following quote is part of the argumentation in Bates (2008): "He contrasts my definition of information as 'observer-independent' with his position that information is 'situational' and adds a list of respected names on the situational side (Hjoerland, 2007, p. 1448). What this sentence, and much of the remainder of his argument, ignores is the fact that my approach accounts for both an observer-independent and a contextual, situational sense of information." Yes, it is correct that I mostly concentrated on refuting Bates' objective definition of information. It is as if Bates expects an overall appraisal of her work rather than providing a specific analysis of the points on which there are disagreements. I see Bates' "having it both ways": a symptom of inconsistence in argumentation.
Bates (2008, p. 843) further writes about her definition of information: "This is the objectivist foundation, the rock bottom minimum of the meaning of information; it informs both articles throughout." This is exactly the focus of my disagreement. If we take a word in a language, it is understood as both being a "pattern of organization of matter and energy" (e.g., a sound) and carrying meaning. But the relation between the physical sign and its meaning is considered an arbitrary relation in linguistics. Any physical material has the potential of carrying any meaning and to inform somebody. The physical stuff in itself is not information until it is used as a sign. An important issue in this debate is whether Bates' examples demonstrate the usefulness of her own position as opposed to mine. Her example about information seeking concerning navigation and how "the very layout of the ship and the design of the bridge promoted the smooth flow of information from the exterior of the ship to the crew and among the crewmembers" (Bates, 2006, pp. 1042-1043) does not justify Bates' definition of information as an objective phenomenon. The design is made for a purpose, and this purpose determines how information should be defined in this context. Bates' view on "curatorial sciences" (2006, p. 1043) is close to Hjorland's suggestions (2000) about "memory institutions," which is based on the subjective understanding of information. However, she does not relate to this proposal, and she does not argue how the objective understanding of information is related to this example. I therefore conclude that Bates' practical examples do not support her objective definition of information, nor do they support her "having it both ways." Finally, I exemplify the consequences of my understanding of information by showing how an archaeologist and a geologist might represent the same stone differently in information systems. Bates (2008, p. 843) writes about this example: "This position is completely consistent with mine." However, this "consistency" was not recognized by Bates until I published my objections and, therefore, this is an indication that my criticism was needed. I certainly share Professor Bates (2008) advice to read her original articles: They contain much important stuff. I just recommend that the reader ignore the parts that argue about information being an objective phenomenon."
References Bates, M.J. (2005). Information and knowledge: An evolutionary framework for information science. Information Research, 10(4), paper 239. Available at http://InformationR.net/ir/10-4/paper239.html. Bates, M.J. (2006). Fundamental forms of information. Journal of the American Society for Information Science and Technology, 57(8), 1033-1045. Bates, M.J. (2008). Hjorland's critique of Bates' work on defining information. Journal of the American Society for Information Science and Technology, 59(5), 842-844. Hjoerland, B. (2000). Documents, memory institutions, and information science. Journal of Documentation, 56, 27-41. Hjoerland, B. (2007). Information: Objective or subjective-situational? Journal of the American Society for Information Science and Technology, 58(10), 1448-1456. Karpatschof, B. (2000). Human activity. Contributions to the anthropological sciences from a perspective of activity theory. Copenhagen: Dansk Psykologisk Forlag. Retrieved May 14, 2007, from http://informationr.net/ir/ 12-3/Karpatschof/Karp00.html.

Date

22. 3.2009 18:13:27

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Abstract

This paper investigates the problem of the labelling of the library, documentation and information field with particular emphasis on the terms 'information' and 'document'. What influences introduced the concept of 'information' into the library field in the middle of the 20th century? What kind of theoretical orientation have dominated the field, and how are these orientations linked to epistemological assumptions? What is the implication of the recent influence of socially oriented epistemologies for such basic concepts in IS as 'information' and 'document'? The article explores these problems and advocates an approach with emphasis on documents and on the concept 'memory institution' as generic term for the central object of study

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Abstract

The term 'the bibliographic paradigm' is used in the literature of library and information science, but is a very seldom term and is almost always negatively described. This paper reconsiders this concept. Method. The method is mainly 'analytical'. Empirical data concerning the current state of the UDC-classification system are also presented in order to illuminate the connection between theory and practice. Analysis. The bibliographic paradigm is understood as a perspective in library and information science focusing on documents and information resources, their description, organization, mediation and use. This perspective is examined as one among other metatheories of library and information science and its philosophical assumptions and implications are outlined. Results. The neglect and misunderstanding of 'the bibliographic paradigm' as well as the quality of the new UDC-classification indicate that both the metatheoretical discourses on library and information science and its concrete practice seem to be in a state of crisis.

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Abstract

Knowledge Organization (KO) is about activities such as document description, indexing and classification performed in libraries, databases, archives etc. These activities are done by librarians, archivists, subject specialists as well as by computer algorithms. KO as a field of study is concerned with the nature and quality of such knowledge organizing processes (KOP) as well as the knowledge organizing systems (KOS) used to organize documents, document representations and concepts. There exist different historical and theoretical approaches to and theories about KO, which are related to different views of knowledge, cognition, language, and social organization. Each of these approaches tends to answer the question: "What is knowledge organization?" differently. LIS professionals have often concentrated on applying new technology and standards, and may not have seen their work as involving interpretation and analysis of meaning. That is why library classification has been criticized for a lack of substantive intellectual content. Traditional human-based activities are increasingly challenged by computer-based retrieval techniques. It is appropriate to investigate the relative contributions of different approaches; the current challenges make it imperative to reconsider this understanding. This paper offers an understanding of KO based on an explicit theory of knowledge.

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Abstract

The aim of this chapter is to demonstrate that semantic issues underlie all research questions within Library and Information Science (LIS, or, as hereafter, IS) and, in particular, the subfield known as Knowledge Organization (KO). Further, it seeks to show that semantics is a field influenced by conflicting views and discusses why it is important to argue for the most fruitful one of these. Moreover, the chapter demonstrates that IS has not yet addressed semantic problems in systematic fashion and examines why the field is very fragmented and without a proper theoretical basis. The focus here is on broad interdisciplinary issues and the long-term perspective. The theoretical problems involving semantics and concepts are very complicated. Therefore, this chapter starts by considering tools developed in KO for information retrieval (IR) as basically semantic tools. In this way, it establishes a specific IS focus on the relation between KO and semantics. It is well known that thesauri consist of a selection of concepts supplemented with information about their semantic relations (such as generic relations or "associative relations"). Some words in thesauri are "preferred terms" (descriptors), whereas others are "lead-in terms." The descriptors represent concepts. The difference between "a word" and "a concept" is that different words may have the same meaning and similar words may have different meanings, whereas one concept expresses one meaning.

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Abstract

Concept theory is an extremely broad, interdisciplinary and complex field of research related to many deep fields with very long historical traditions without much consensus. However, information science and knowledge organization cannot avoid relating to theories of concepts. Knowledge organizing systems (e.g., classification systems, thesauri, and ontologies) should be understood as systems basically organizing concepts and their semantic relations. The same is the case with information retrieval systems. Different theories of concepts have different implications for how to construe, evaluate, and use such systems. Based on a post-Kuhnian view of paradigms, this article put forward arguments that the best understanding and classification of theories of concepts is to view and classify them in accordance with epistemological theories (empiricism, rationalism, historicism, and pragmatism). It is also argued that the historicist and pragmatist understandings of concepts are the most fruitful views and that this understanding may be part of a broader paradigm shift that is also beginning to take place in information science. The importance of historicist and pragmatic theories of concepts for information science is outlined.

Footnote

Vgl.: Szostak, R.: Comment on Hjørland's concept theory in: Journal of the American Society for Information Science and Technology. 61(2010) no.5, S. 1076-1077 und die Erwiderung darauf von B. Hjoerland (S.1078-1080)

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Abstract

This article presents a socio-cognitive perspective in relation to information science (IS) and information retrieval (IR). The differences between traditional cognitive views and the socio-cognitive or domain-analytic view are outlined. It is claimed that, given elementary skills in computer-based retrieval, people are basically interacting with representations of subject literatures in IR. The kind of knowledge needed to interact with representations of subject literatures is discussed. It is shown how different approaches or "paradigms" in the represented literature imply different information needs and relevance criteria (which users typically cannot express very well, which is why IS cannot primarily rely on user studies). These principles are exemplified by comparing behaviorism, cognitivism, psychoanalysis, and neuroscience as approaches in psychology. The relevance criteria implicit in each position are outlined, and empirical data are provided to prove the theoretical claims. It is further shown that the most general level of relevance criteria is implied by epistemological theories. The article concludes that the fundamental problems of IS and IR are based in epistemology, which therefore becomes the most important allied field for IS.

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Abstract

This article contrasts Bates' understanding of information as an observer-independent phenomenon with an understanding of information as situational, put forward by, among others, Bateson, Yovits, Spang-Hanssen, Brier, Buckland, Goguen, and Hjorland. The conflict between objective and subjective ways of understanding information corresponds to the conflict between an understanding of information as a thing or a substance versus an understanding of it as a sign. It is a fundamental distinction that involves a whole theory of knowledge, and it has roots back to different metaphors applied in Shannon's information theory. It is argued that a subject-dependent/ situation specific understanding of information is best suited to fulfill the needs in information science and that it is urgent for us to base Information Science (IS; or Library and Information Science, LIS) on this alternative theoretical frame.

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Abstract

Purpose - The purpose of this research is to examine the practical potentials of Bradford's law in relation to core-journal identification. Design/methodology/approach - Literature studies and empirical tests (Bradford analyses). Findings - Literature studies reveal that the concept of "subject" has never been explicitly addressed in relation to Bradford's law. The results of two empirical tests (Bradford analyses) demonstrate that different operationalizations of the concept of "subject" produce quite different lists of core-journals. Further, an empirical test reveals that Bradford analyses function discriminatorily against minority views. Practical implications - Bradford analysis can no longer be regarded as an objective and neutral method. The received view on Bradford's law needs to be revised. Originality/value - The paper questions one of the old dogmas of the field.

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Abstract

Relationships between Knowledge Organization in LIS and Scientific & Scholarly Classifications In her paper "Classification for Information Retrieval and Classification for Knowledge Discovery: Relationships between 'Professional' and 'Naive' Classifications" (KO v30, no.2, 2003), Beghtol outlines how Scholarly activities and research lead to classification systems which subsequently are disseminated in publications which are classified in information retrieval systems, retrieved by the users and again used in Scholarly activities and so on. We think this model is correct and that its point is important. What we are reacting to is the fact that Beghtol describes the Classifications developed by scholars as "naive" while she describes the Classifications developed by librarians and information scientists as "professional." We fear that this unfortunate terminology is rooted in deeply ar chored misjudgments about the relationships between scientific and Scholarly classification an the one side and LIS Classifications an the other. Only a correction of this misjudgment may give us in the field of knowledge organization a Chance to do a job that is not totally disrespected and disregarded by the rest of the intellectual world.

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Abstract

Purpose - The purpose of this paper is to examine the importance and influence of the epistemologies: "empiricism", "rationalism" and "positivism" in library and information science (LIS). Design/methodology/approach - First, outlines the historical development of these epistemologies, by discussing and identifying basic characteristics in them and by introducing the criticism that has been raised against these views. Second, their importance for and influence in LIS have been examined. Findings - The findings of this paper are that it is not a trivial matter to define those epistemologies and to characterise their influence. Many different interpretations exist and there is no consensus regarding current influence of positivism in LIS. Arguments are put forward that empiricism and positivism are still dominant within LIS and specific examples of the influence on positivism in LIS are provided. A specific analysis is made of the empiricist view of information seeking and it is shown that empiricism may be regarded as a normative theory of information seeking and knowledge organisation. Originality/value - The paper discusses basic theoretical issues that are important for the further development of LIS as a scholarly field.

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Abstract

In 1971 UNISIST proposed a model for scientific and technical communication. This model has been widely cited and additional models have been added to the literature. There is a need to bring this model to the focus of information science (IS) research as well as to update and revise it. There are both empirical and theoretical reasons for this need. On the empirical side much has happened in the developments of electronic communication that needs to be considered. From a theoretical point of view the domain-analytic view has proposed that differences between different disciplines and domains should be emphasised. The original model only considered scientific and technical communication as a whole. There is a need both to compare with the humanities and social sciences and to regard internal differences in the sciences. There are also other reasons to reconsider and modify this model today. Offers not only a descriptive model, but also a theoretical perspective from which information systems may be understood and evaluated. In addition to this provides empirical exemplification and proposals for research initiatives.

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Abstract

The basic realist claim is that a mind-independent reality exists. It should be common sense knowledge to accept this claim, just as any theories that try to deny it soon become inconsistent because reality strikes back. In spite of this, antirealist philosophies flourish, not only in philosophy but also in the behavioral and cognitive sciences and in information science. This is highly problematic because it removes the attention from reality to subjective phenomena with no real explanatory power. Realism should not be confused with the view that all scientific claims are true or with any other kind of naiveté concerning knowledge claims. The opposite of realism may be termed antirealism, idealism, or nominalism. Although many people confuse empiricism and positivism with realism, these traditions are by nature strongly antirealist, which is why a sharp distinction should be made between empiricism and realism. Empirical research should not be founded on assumptions about "the given" of observations, but should recognize the theory-laden nature of observations. Domain analysis represents an attempt to reintroduce a realist perspective in library and information science. A realist conception of relevance, information seeking, information retrieval, and knowledge organization is outlined. Information systems of all kinds, including research libraries and public libraries, should be informed by a realist philosophy and a realist information science.

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Abstract

Bradfordrsquos law of scattering is said to be about subject scattering in information sources. However, in spite of a corpus of writings about the meaning of the word ldquosubjectrdquo and equivalent terms such as ldquoaboutnessrdquo or ldquotopicalityrdquo, the meaning of ldquosubjectrdquo has never been explicitly addressed in relation to Bradfordrsquos law. This paper introduces a distinction between Lexical scattering, Semantic scattering, and Subject scattering. Neither Bradford himself nor any follower has explicitly considered the differences between these three and the implications for the practical applications of Bradfordrsquos law. Traditionally, Bradfordrsquos law has been seen as a neutral and objective tool for the selection of the most central information sources in a field. However, it is hard to find actual reports that describe how Bradfordrsquos law has been applied in practical library and information services. Theoretical as well as historical evidence suggest that the selection of journals based on Bradford-distributions tend to favorite dominant theories and views while suppressing views other than the mainstream at a given time.

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Abstract

Purpose - To suggest that a theory of classification for information retrieval (IR), asked for by Spärck Jones in a 1970 paper, presupposes a full implementation of a pragmatic understanding. Part of the Journal of Documentation celebration, "60 years of the best in information research". Design/methodology/approach - Literature-based conceptual analysis, taking Sparck Jones as its starting-point. Analysis involves distinctions between "positivism" and "pragmatism" and "classical" versus Kuhnian understandings of concepts. Findings - Classification, both manual and automatic, for retrieval benefits from drawing upon a combination of qualitative and quantitative techniques, a consideration of theories of meaning, and the adding of top-down approaches to IR in which divisions of labour, domains, traditions, genres, document architectures etc. are included as analytical elements and in which specific IR algorithms are based on the examination of specific literatures. Introduces an example illustrating the consequences of a full implementation of a pragmatist understanding when handling homonyms. Practical implications - Outlines how to classify from a pragmatic-philosophical point of view. Originality/value - Provides, emphasizing a pragmatic understanding, insights of importance to classification for retrieval, both manual and automatic. - Vgl. auch: Szostak, R.: Classification, interdisciplinarity, and the study of science. In: Journal of documentation. 64(2008) no.3, S.319-332.

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Content

"Bias" is normally understood as a negatively loaded word, as something to be avoided or minimized, for example, in statistics or in knowledge organization. Recently Melanie Feinberg suggested, however, that "if we cannot eliminate bias, then we should instead attempt to be more responsible about it and explicitly decide on and defend the perspectives represented in information systems". This view is linked to related views: That knowledge organization is too much concerned with information retrieval and too much described in the mode of scientific discovery, as opposed to the mode of artifact design: "From the literary warrant of Hulme to the terminological warrant of the Classification Research Group (CRG), to Hjorland's domain analysis, the classificationist seems like one who documents and compiles, and not one who actively shapes design." This paper examines these claims, which may be understood as questions about subjectivity and objectivity in classification and about positivism versus pragmatism in research. Is KO an objective and neutral activity? Can it be? Should it be? A dominant view has been that knowledge and KO should be understood as a passive reflection øf an external order. This has been termed the mirror metaphor of knowledge and is related to empiricism and positivism. The opposite view which is in accordance with both Feinberg and Hjorland - states that knowledge organization should be functional and thus reflecting given goals, purposes and values. It is related to pragmatism in philosophy.

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Abstract

It is with very great pleasure that we introduce this special issue of Knowledge Organization on Domain Analysis (DA). Domain analysis is an approach to information science (IS) that emphasizes the social, historical, and cultural dimensions of information. It asserts that collective fields of knowledge, or "domains," form the unit of analysis of information science (IS). DA, elsewhere referred to as a sociocognitive (Hjoerland, 2002b; Jacob & Shaw, 1998) or collectivist (Talja et al, 2004) approach, is one of the major metatheoretical perspectives available to IS scholars to orient their thinking and research. DA's focus an domains stands in contrast to the alternative metatheories of cognitivism and information systems, which direct attention to psychological processes and technological processes, respectively. The first comprehensive international formulation of DA as an explicit point of view was Hjoerland and Albrechtsen (1995). However, a concern for information in the context of a community can be traced back to American library historian and visionary Jesse Shera, and is visible a century ago in the earliest practices of special librarians and European documentalists. More recently, Hjoerland (1998) produced a domain analytic study of the field of psychology; Jacob and Shaw (1998) made an important interpretation and historical review of DA; while Hjoerland (2002a) offered a seminal formulation of eleven approaches to the study of domains, receiving the ASLIB 2003 Award. Fjordback Soendergaard; Andersen and Hjoerland (2003) suggested an approach based an an updated version of the UNISIST-model of scientific communication. In fall 2003, under the conference theme of "Humanizing Information Technology" DA was featured in a keynote address at the annual meeting of the American Society for Information Science and Technology (Hjorland, 2004). These publications and events are evidence of growth in representation of the DA view. To date, informal criticism of domain analysis has followed two tracks. Firstly, that DA assumes its communities to be academic in nature, leaving much of human experience unexplored. Secondly, that there is a lack of case studies illustrating the methods of domain analytic empirical research. Importantly, this special collection marks progress by addressing both issues. In the articles that follow, domains are perceived to be hobbies, professions, and realms of popular culture. Further, other papers serve as models of different ways to execute domain analytic scholarship, whether through traditional empirical methods, or historical and philosophical techniques. Eleven authors have contributed to this special issue, and their backgrounds reflect the diversity of interest in DA. Contributors come from North America, Europe, and the Middle East. Academics from leading research universities are represented. One writer is newly retired, several are in their heyday as scholars, and some are doctoral students just entering this field. This range of perspectives enriches the collection. The first two papers in this issue are invited papers and are, in our opinion, very important. Anders Oerom was a senior lecturer at the Royal Scbool of 'Library and Information Science in Denmark, Aalborg Branch. He retired from this position an March 1, 2004, and this paper is his last contribution in this position. We are grateful that he took the time to complete "Knowledge Organization in the Domain of Art Studies - History, Transition and Conceptual Changes" in spite of many other duties. Versions of the paper have previously been presented at a Ph.D-course in knowledge organization and related versions have been published in Danish and Spanish. In many respects, it represents a model of how a domain could, or should, be investigated from the DA point of view.