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Content

"This letter considers some main arguments in Professor Bates' article (2008), which is part of our former debate (Bates, 2005,2006; Hjoerland, 2007). Bates (2008) does not write much to restate or enlarge on her theoretical position but is mostly arguing about what she claims Hjorland (2007) ignored or misinterpreted in her two articles. Bates (2008, p. 842) wrote that my arguments did not reflect "a standard of coherence, consistency, and logic that is expected of an argument presented in a scientific journal." My argumentation below will refute this statement. This controversy is whether information should be understood as a subjective phenomenon (alone), as an objective phenomenon (alone), or as a combined objective and a subjective phenomenon ("having it both ways"). Bates (2006) defined "information" (sometimes, e.g., termed "information 1," p. 1042) as an objective phenomenon and "information 2" as a subjective phenomenon. However, sometimes the term "information" is also used as a synonym for "information 2," e.g., "the term information is understood to refer to one or both senses" (p. 1042). Thus, Professor Bates is not consistent in using the terminology that she herself introduces, and confusion in this controversy may be caused by Professor Bates' ambiguity in her use of the term "information." Bates (2006, p. 1033) defined information as an objective phenomenon by joining a definition by Edwin Parker: "Information is the pattern of organization of matter and energy." The argument in Hjoerland (2007) is, by contrast, that information should be understood as a subjective phenomenon all the way down: That neither the objective definition of information nor "having it both ways" is fruitful. This is expressed, for example, by joining Karpatschof's (2000) definition of information as a physical signal relative to a certain release mechanism, which implies that information is not something objective that can be understood independently of an observer or independently of other kinds of mechanism that are programmed to be sensitive to specific attributes of a signal: There are many differences in the world, and each of them is potentially informative in given situations. Regarding Parker's definition, "patterns of organization of matter and energy" are no more than that until they inform somebody about something. When they inform somebody about something, they may be considered information. The following quote is part of the argumentation in Bates (2008): "He contrasts my definition of information as 'observer-independent' with his position that information is 'situational' and adds a list of respected names on the situational side (Hjoerland, 2007, p. 1448). What this sentence, and much of the remainder of his argument, ignores is the fact that my approach accounts for both an observer-independent and a contextual, situational sense of information." Yes, it is correct that I mostly concentrated on refuting Bates' objective definition of information. It is as if Bates expects an overall appraisal of her work rather than providing a specific analysis of the points on which there are disagreements. I see Bates' "having it both ways": a symptom of inconsistence in argumentation.
Bates (2008, p. 843) further writes about her definition of information: "This is the objectivist foundation, the rock bottom minimum of the meaning of information; it informs both articles throughout." This is exactly the focus of my disagreement. If we take a word in a language, it is understood as both being a "pattern of organization of matter and energy" (e.g., a sound) and carrying meaning. But the relation between the physical sign and its meaning is considered an arbitrary relation in linguistics. Any physical material has the potential of carrying any meaning and to inform somebody. The physical stuff in itself is not information until it is used as a sign. An important issue in this debate is whether Bates' examples demonstrate the usefulness of her own position as opposed to mine. Her example about information seeking concerning navigation and how "the very layout of the ship and the design of the bridge promoted the smooth flow of information from the exterior of the ship to the crew and among the crewmembers" (Bates, 2006, pp. 1042-1043) does not justify Bates' definition of information as an objective phenomenon. The design is made for a purpose, and this purpose determines how information should be defined in this context. Bates' view on "curatorial sciences" (2006, p. 1043) is close to Hjorland's suggestions (2000) about "memory institutions," which is based on the subjective understanding of information. However, she does not relate to this proposal, and she does not argue how the objective understanding of information is related to this example. I therefore conclude that Bates' practical examples do not support her objective definition of information, nor do they support her "having it both ways." Finally, I exemplify the consequences of my understanding of information by showing how an archaeologist and a geologist might represent the same stone differently in information systems. Bates (2008, p. 843) writes about this example: "This position is completely consistent with mine." However, this "consistency" was not recognized by Bates until I published my objections and, therefore, this is an indication that my criticism was needed. I certainly share Professor Bates (2008) advice to read her original articles: They contain much important stuff. I just recommend that the reader ignore the parts that argue about information being an objective phenomenon."

Date

22. 3.2009 18:13:27

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Date

21. 7.2006 14:11:22

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Abstract

Special classifications have been somewhat neglected in KO compared to general classifications. The methodology of constructing special classifications is important, however, also for the methodology of constructing general classification schemes. The methodology of constructing special classifications can be regarded as one among about a dozen approaches to domain analysis. The methodology of (special) classification in LIS has been dominated by the rationalistic facet-analytic tradition, which, however, neglects the question of the empirical basis of classification. The empirical basis is much better grasped by, for example, bibliometric methods. Even the combination of rational and empirical methods is insufficient. This presentation will provide evidence for the necessity of historical and pragmatic methods for the methodology of classification and will point to the necessity of analyzing "paradigms". The presentation covers the methods of constructing classifications from Ranganathan to the design of ontologies in computer science and further to the recent "paradigm shift" in classification research. 1. Introduction Classification of a subject field is one among about eleven approaches to analyzing a domain that are specific for information science and in my opinion define the special competencies of information specialists (Hjoerland, 2002a). Classification and knowledge organization are commonly regarded as core qualifications of librarians and information specialists. Seen from this perspective one expects a firm methodological basis for the field. This paper tries to explore the state-of-the-art conceming the methodology of classification. 2. Classification: Science or non-science? As it is part of the curriculum at universities and subject in scientific journals and conferences like ISKO, orte expects classification/knowledge organization to be a scientific or scholarly activity and a scientific field. However, very often when information specialists classify or index documents and when they revise classification system, the methods seem to be rather ad hoc. Research libraries or scientific databases may employ people with adequate subject knowledge. When information scientists construct or evaluate systems, they very often elicit the knowledge from "experts" (Hjorland, 2002b, p. 260). Mostly no specific arguments are provided for the specific decisions in these processes.

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Abstract

It is with very great pleasure that we introduce this special issue of Knowledge Organization on Domain Analysis (DA). Domain analysis is an approach to information science (IS) that emphasizes the social, historical, and cultural dimensions of information. It asserts that collective fields of knowledge, or "domains," form the unit of analysis of information science (IS). DA, elsewhere referred to as a sociocognitive (Hjoerland, 2002b; Jacob & Shaw, 1998) or collectivist (Talja et al, 2004) approach, is one of the major metatheoretical perspectives available to IS scholars to orient their thinking and research. DA's focus an domains stands in contrast to the alternative metatheories of cognitivism and information systems, which direct attention to psychological processes and technological processes, respectively. The first comprehensive international formulation of DA as an explicit point of view was Hjoerland and Albrechtsen (1995). However, a concern for information in the context of a community can be traced back to American library historian and visionary Jesse Shera, and is visible a century ago in the earliest practices of special librarians and European documentalists. More recently, Hjoerland (1998) produced a domain analytic study of the field of psychology; Jacob and Shaw (1998) made an important interpretation and historical review of DA; while Hjoerland (2002a) offered a seminal formulation of eleven approaches to the study of domains, receiving the ASLIB 2003 Award. Fjordback Soendergaard; Andersen and Hjoerland (2003) suggested an approach based an an updated version of the UNISIST-model of scientific communication. In fall 2003, under the conference theme of "Humanizing Information Technology" DA was featured in a keynote address at the annual meeting of the American Society for Information Science and Technology (Hjorland, 2004). These publications and events are evidence of growth in representation of the DA view. To date, informal criticism of domain analysis has followed two tracks. Firstly, that DA assumes its communities to be academic in nature, leaving much of human experience unexplored. Secondly, that there is a lack of case studies illustrating the methods of domain analytic empirical research. Importantly, this special collection marks progress by addressing both issues. In the articles that follow, domains are perceived to be hobbies, professions, and realms of popular culture. Further, other papers serve as models of different ways to execute domain analytic scholarship, whether through traditional empirical methods, or historical and philosophical techniques. Eleven authors have contributed to this special issue, and their backgrounds reflect the diversity of interest in DA. Contributors come from North America, Europe, and the Middle East. Academics from leading research universities are represented. One writer is newly retired, several are in their heyday as scholars, and some are doctoral students just entering this field. This range of perspectives enriches the collection. The first two papers in this issue are invited papers and are, in our opinion, very important. Anders Oerom was a senior lecturer at the Royal Scbool of 'Library and Information Science in Denmark, Aalborg Branch. He retired from this position an March 1, 2004, and this paper is his last contribution in this position. We are grateful that he took the time to complete "Knowledge Organization in the Domain of Art Studies - History, Transition and Conceptual Changes" in spite of many other duties. Versions of the paper have previously been presented at a Ph.D-course in knowledge organization and related versions have been published in Danish and Spanish. In many respects, it represents a model of how a domain could, or should, be investigated from the DA point of view.