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Abstract

This book provides a comprehensive account of the intentionality of perceptual experience. With special emphasis on vision Searle explains how the raw phenomenology of perception sets the content and the conditions of satisfaction of experience. The central question concerns the relation between the subjective conscious perceptual field and the objective perceptual field. Everything in the objective field is either perceived or can be perceived. Nothing in the subjective field is perceived nor can be perceived precisely because the events in the subjective field consist of the perceivings, whether veridical or not, of the events in the objective field.
Searle begins by criticizing the classical theories of perception and identifies a single fallacy, what he calls the Bad Argument, as the source of nearly all of the confusions in the history of the philosophy of perception. He next justifies the claim that perceptual experiences have presentational intentionality and shows how this justifies the direct realism of his account. In the central theoretical chapters, he shows how it is possible that the raw phenomenology must necessarily determine certain form of intentionality. Searle introduces, in detail, the distinction between different levels of perception from the basic level to the higher levels and shows the internal relation between the features of the experience and the states of affairs presented by the experience. The account applies not just to language possessing human beings but to infants and conscious animals. He also discusses how the account relates to certain traditional puzzles about spectrum inversion, color and size constancy and the brain-in-the-vat thought experiments. In the final chapters he explains and refutes Disjunctivist theories of perception, explains the role of unconscious perception, and concludes by discussing traditional problems of perception such as skepticism.

Content

The Bad Argument Summary of the Theory of Intentionality Consciousness The Intentionality of Perceptual Experiences Further Developments of the Argument Against the Bad Argument How Perceptual Intentionality Works I: Basic Features, Causation, and Intentional Content How Perceptual Intentionality Works II: Extending the Analysis to Non-basic Features Disjunctivism Unconscious Perception Classical Theories of Perception

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Footnote

Originaltitel: The rediscovery of the mind. Weitere Ausgabe bei Suhrkamp (Suhrkamp-Taschenbuch ; 2550)

RSWK

Philosophy of Mind

Subject

Philosophy of Mind

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Content

Vgl. auch: Vgl. auch: Siebert, H.: Sozialkonstruktivismus: Gesellschaft als Konstruktion. In: Journal of social science education. 3(2004) no.2, S.95-103.

Footnote

Originaltitel: The construction of social reality. Deutsche Erstausgabe: 1997 (Rowohlt Taschenbuch-Verl. (Rowohlts Enzyklopädie;55587)).

LCSH

Philosophy of Mind

Subject

Philosophy of Mind

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LCSH

Philosophy of Mind

RSWK

Philosophy of Mind / Einführung

Subject

Philosophy of Mind / Einführung
Philosophy of Mind

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Abstract

Als der Neurowissenschaftler Maxwell Bennett und der Philosoph Peter Hacker 2003 den voluminösen Band Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience veröffentlichten, war dies nicht nur die erste systematische Untersuchung der begrifflichen Grundlagen der Neurowissenschaften. Es war auch der Startschuß für den bis heute intensiv geführten Kampf um die Deutungsmacht in bezug auf den menschlichen Geist. Besonders kritisch fiel seinerzeit die Auseinandersetzung der beiden Autoren mit den einflußreichen Arbeiten von Daniel Dennett und John Searle aus - also mit jenen beiden Denkern, die von der neurowissenschaftlichen Seite gerne als philosophische Gewährsmänner herangezogen werden. Mit Neurowissenschaft und Philosophie ist nun das Kunststück gelungen, die vier kongenialen »Streithähne« in einem Band zu versammeln. Im ersten Teil des Buches wird das zentrale Argument von Bennett und Hacker präsentiert, das unter anderem jene begrifflichen Verwirrungen offenlegt, denen Neurowissenschaftler allzu häufig unterliegen, wenn sie aus ihren empirischen Forschungen die bekannten weitreichenden Schlußfolgerungen etwa über das Wesen des Menschen ziehen. Der zweite und dritte Teil sind ganz der Debatte gewidmet: Auf die Einwände von Dennett und Searle folgen erneute Erwiderungen von Bennett und Hacker. Den Abschluß bildet ein kurzer Epilog von Maxwell Bennett, gerahmt wird das Ganze durch eine Einleitung und eine Schlußbetrachtung des Philosophen Daniel Robinson. Der Band zeigt vier Meister ihres Fachs in einem Duell auf höchstem Niveau, ausgetragen mit einem gehörigen Schuß Leidenschaft. Darüber hinaus bietet er eine ausgezeichnete und vor allem gut lesbare Zusammenfassung über den Stand der Dinge in einer der wichtigsten Science Battles unserer Zeit. Lebendige Wissenschaft par excellence.