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Abstract

Die Intentionalität bzw. der repräsentationale Gehalt mentaler Zustände und sprachlicher Äußerungen steht nach wie vor im Zentrum der Sprachphilosophie und der Philosophie des Geistes. Auf das Problem der Naturalisierbarkeit von Intentionalität ist heute der Funktionalismus die vorherrschende Antwort, der jedoch von zwei Seiten her in Frage gestellt wird: zum einen von jenen, die eine externalistische Individuierung mentaler Zustände propagieren und damit einer intern-funktionalistischen Individuierung widersprechen, und zum andern von jenen, die argumentieren, dass sich der phänomenale Charakter mentaler Zustände funktionalistisch nicht beschreiben lässt. Die Erörterung dieser Fragen wird zudem von der Schwierigkeit überlagert, dass sich nur über eine Untersuchung der komplexen Formen der Zuschreibung intentionaler Zustände erschließt, wovon bei intentionalen Zuständen die Rede ist. Die im Band versammelten Beiträge kreisen um die genannten Probleme und legen die aktuellen Auffassungen prominenter deutscher Philosophen zu diesen Fragen dar. Mit Beiträgen von: A. Beckermann, D. Bodrozic, U. Haas-Spohn, H.-D. Heckmann, F. Hofmann, H Kamp, A. Kemmerling, N. Kompa, M. Kupffer, T. Metzinger, U. Meyer, A. Newen, M. Nida-Rümelin, K. Saporiti, M. Siebel, W. Spohn, M. Textor.

Issue

[Tagung ... am 23. und 24. März 2000 im Rahmen der DFG-Forschergruppe "Logik in der Philosophie" an der Universität Konstanz].

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Abstract

John Dupre warns that our understanding of human nature is being distorted by two faulty and harmful forms of pseudo-scientific thinking. Not just in the academic world but increasingly in everyday life, we find one set of experts seeking to explain the ends at which humans aim in terms of evolutionary theory, and another set of experts using economic models to give rules of how we act to achieve those ends. Dupre charges this unholy alliance of evolutionary psychologists and rational-choice theorists with scientific imperialism: they use methods and ideas developed for one domain of inquiry in others where they are inappropriate. He demonstrates that these theorists' explanations do not work, and furthermore that if taken seriously their theories tend to have dangerous social and political consequences. For these reasons, it is important to resist scientism - an exaggerated conception of what science can be expected to do for us. To say this is in no way to be against science - just against bad science. Dupre restores sanity to the study of human nature by pointing the way to a proper understanding of humans in the societies that are our natural and necessary environments.He shows how our distinctively human capacities are shaped by the social contexts in which we are embedded. And he concludes with a bold challenge to one of the intellectual touchstones of modern science: the idea of the universe as causally complete and deterministic. In an impressive rehabilitation of the idea of free human agency, he argues that far from being helpless cogs in a mechanistic universe, humans are rare concentrations of causal power in a largely indeterministic world. Human Nature and the Limits of Science is a provocative, witty, and persuasive corrective to scientism. In its place, Dupre commends a pluralistic approach to science, as the appropriate way to investigate a universe that is not unified in form. Anyone interested in science and human nature will enjoy this book, unless they are its targets. Dupre writes with considerable grace and economy...this book works very well indeed as a critique of the presumptions of two simplistic projects that wield undo influence on our conception of us. This critique alone is worth the price of the book. Richard C. Francis, Biology and Philosophy 'excellent, clear, and helpful' His [Dupre's] criticisms are well made ... His approach is certainly interesting and deserving of both scrutiny and elaboration ... Dupre ends with the wonderful suggestion that his view leaves a role for philosophy as providing a "synoptic and integrative vision", and so moving "from underlabourer to Queen of the Sciences" The Philosophers' Magazine

BK

30.02 (Philosophie und Theorie der Naturwissenschaften)

Classification

30.02 (Philosophie und Theorie der Naturwissenschaften)

Footnote

Rez. in: KO 40(2013) no.2, S-149-151 (Elizabeth Milonas); vgl. http://www.ergon-verlag.de/isko_ko/downloads/ko_40_2013_2_g.pdf.