Search (2 results, page 1 of 1)

  • × theme_ss:"Begriffstheorie"
  • × theme_ss:"Information"
  • × year_i:[2010 TO 2020}
  1. Szostak, R.: Complex concepts into basic concepts (2011) 0.00 
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    Abstract
    Interdisciplinary communication, and thus the rate of progress in scholarly understanding, would be greatly enhanced if scholars had access to a universal classification of documents or ideas not grounded in particular disciplines or cultures. Such a classification is feasible if complex concepts can be understood as some combination of more basic concepts. There appear to be five main types of concept theory in the philosophical literature. Each provides some support for the idea of breaking complex into basic concepts that can be understood across disciplines or cultures, but each has detractors. None of these criticisms represents a substantive obstacle to breaking complex concepts into basic concepts within information science. Can we take the subject entries in existing universal but discipline-based classifications, and break these into a set of more basic concepts that can be applied across disciplinary classes? The author performs this sort of analysis for Dewey classes 300 to 339.9. This analysis will serve to identify the sort of 'basic concepts' that would lie at the heart of a truly universal classification. There are two key types of basic concept: the things we study (individuals, rocks, trees), and the relationships among these (talking, moving, paying).
    Type
    a
  2. Thellefsen, M.M.; Thellefsen, T.; Sørensen, B.: Information as signs : a semiotic analysis of the information concept, determining its ontological and epistemological foundations (2018) 0.00 
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    Abstract
    The purpose of this paper is to formulate an analytical framework for the information concept based on the semiotic theory. Design/methodology/approach The paper is motivated by the apparent controversy that still surrounds the information concept. Information, being a key concept within LIS, suffers from being anchored in various incompatible theories. The paper suggests that information is signs, and it demonstrates how the concept of information can be understood within C.S. Peirce's phenomenologically rooted semiotic. Hence, from there, certain ontological conditions as well epistemological consequences of the information concept can be deduced. Findings The paper argues that an understanding of information, as either objective or subjective/discursive, leads to either objective reductionism and signal processing, that fails to explain how information becomes meaningful at all, or conversely, information is understood only relative to subjective/discursive intentions, agendas, etc. To overcome the limitations of defining information as either objective or subjective/discursive, a semiotic analysis shows that information understood as signs is consistently sensitive to both objective and subjective/discursive features of information. It is consequently argued that information as concept should be defined in relation to ontological conditions having certain epistemological consequences. Originality/value The paper presents an analytical framework, derived from semiotics, that adds to the developments of the philosophical dimensions of information within LIS.
    Type
    a

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