Search (7 results, page 1 of 1)

  • × theme_ss:"Begriffstheorie"
  • × year_i:[2010 TO 2020}
  1. Treude, L.: ¬Das Problem der Konzeptdefinition in der Wissensorganisation : über einen missglückten Versuch der Klärung (2013) 0.05
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    Abstract
    Alon Friedman und Richard P. Smiraglia kündigen in ihrem aktuellen Artikel "Nodes and arcs: concept map, semiotics, and knowledge organization" an, eine "empirical demonstration of how the domain [of knowledge organisation] itself understands the meaning of a concept" durchzuführen. Die Klärung des Konzeptbegriffs ist ein begrüßenswertes Vorhaben, das die Autoren in einer empirischen Untersuchung von concept maps (also Konzeptdiagrammen) aus dem Bereich der Wissensorganisation nachvollziehen wollen. Beschränkte sich Friedman 2011 in seinem Artikel "Concept theory and semiotics in knowledge organization" [Fn 01] noch ausschließlich auf Sprache als Medium im Zeichenprozess, bezieht er sich nun auf Visualisierungen als Repräsentationsform und scheint somit seinen Ansatz um den Aspekt der Bildlichkeit zu erweitern. Zumindest erwartet man dies nach der Lektüre der Beschreibung des aktuellen Vorhabens von Friedman und Smiraglia, das - wie die Autoren verkünden - auf einer semiotischen Grundlage durchgeführt worden sei.
    Content
    Vgl.: http://www.libreas.eu/09treude.htm. Bezug zu: Alon Friedman, Richard P. Smiraglia, (2013): Nodes and arcs: concept map, semiotics, and knowledge organization. In: Journal of Documentation, Vol. 69/1, S.27-48.
    Source
    LIBREAS: Library ideas. no.22, 2013, S.xx-xx
  2. Dahlberg, I.: Begriffsarbeit in der Wissensorganisation (2010) 0.01
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    Source
    Wissensspeicher in digitalen Räumen: Nachhaltigkeit - Verfügbarkeit - semantische Interoperabilität. Proceedings der 11. Tagung der Deutschen Sektion der Internationalen Gesellschaft für Wissensorganisation, Konstanz, 20. bis 22. Februar 2008. Hrsg.: J. Sieglerschmidt u. H.P.Ohly
  3. Hjoerland, B.: Are relations in thesauri "context-free, definitional, and true in all possible worlds"? (2015) 0.01
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    Abstract
    Much of the literature of information science and knowledge organization has accepted and built upon Elaine Svenonius's (2004) claim that "paradigmatic relationships are those that are context-free, definitional, and true in all possible worlds" (p. 583). At the same time, the literature demonstrates a common understanding that paradigmatic relations are the kinds of semantic relations used in thesauri and other knowledge organization systems (including equivalence relations, hierarchical relations, and associative relations). This understanding is problematic and harmful because it directs attention away from the empirical and contextual basis for knowledge-organizing systems. Whether A is a kind of X is certainly not context-free and definitional in empirical sciences or in much everyday information. Semantic relations are theory-dependent and, in biology, for example, a scientific revolution has taken place in which many relations have changed following the new taxonomic paradigm named "cladism." This biological example is not an exception, but the norm. Semantic relations including paradigmatic relations are not a priori but are dependent on subject knowledge, scientific findings, and paradigms. As long as information scientists and knowledge organizers isolate themselves from subject knowledge, knowledge organization cannot possibly progress.
  4. Marradi, A.: ¬The concept of concept : concepts and terms (2012) 0.01
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    Date
    22. 1.2012 13:11:25
  5. Besler, G.; Szulc, J.: Gottlob Frege's theory of definition as useful tool for knowledge organization : definition of 'context' - case study (2014) 0.01
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    Source
    Knowledge organization in the 21st century: between historical patterns and future prospects. Proceedings of the Thirteenth International ISKO Conference 19-22 May 2014, Kraków, Poland. Ed.: Wieslaw Babik
  6. Machado, L.M.O.; Martínez-Ávila, D.; Simões, M.da Graça de Melo: Concept theory in library and information science : an epistemological analysis (2019) 0.01
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    Abstract
    Purpose The purpose of this paper is to discuss the literature on concept theory in library and information science (LIS) from an epistemological perspective, ascribing each paper to an epistemological family and discussing their relevance in the context of the knowledge organization (KO) domain. Design/methodology/approach This paper adopts a hermeneutic approach for the analysis of the texts that compose the corpus of study following contingency and categorical analyses. More specifically, the paper works with Bardin's contingency analysis and follows Hjørland's families of epistemologies for the categorization. Findings The analysis corroborates the observations made for the last ten years about the scarcity of studies on concept theory in LIS and KO. However, the study also reveals an epistemological turn on concept theory since 2009 that could be considered a departure from the rationalist views that dominated the field and a continuation of a broader paradigm shift in LIS and KO. All analyzed papers except two follow pragmatist or historicist approaches. Originality/value This paper follows-up and systematizes the contributions to the LIS and KO fields on concept theory mainly during the last decade. The epistemological analysis reveals the dominant views in this paradigm shift and the main authors and trends that are present in the LIS literature on concept theory.
  7. Onofri, A.: Concepts in context (2013) 0.01
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    Abstract
    My thesis discusses two related problems that have taken center stage in the recent literature on concepts: 1) What are the individuation conditions of concepts? Under what conditions is a concept Cv(1) the same concept as a concept Cv(2)? 2) What are the possession conditions of concepts? What conditions must be satisfied for a thinker to have a concept C? The thesis defends a novel account of concepts, which I call "pluralist-contextualist": 1) Pluralism: Different concepts have different kinds of individuation and possession conditions: some concepts are individuated more "coarsely", have less demanding possession conditions and are widely shared, while other concepts are individuated more "finely" and not shared. 2) Contextualism: When a speaker ascribes a propositional attitude to a subject S, or uses his ascription to explain/predict S's behavior, the speaker's intentions in the relevant context determine the correct individuation conditions for the concepts involved in his report. In chapters 1-3 I defend a contextualist, non-Millian theory of propositional attitude ascriptions. Then, I show how contextualism can be used to offer a novel perspective on the problem of concept individuation/possession. More specifically, I employ contextualism to provide a new, more effective argument for Fodor's "publicity principle": if contextualism is true, then certain specific concepts must be shared in order for interpersonally applicable psychological generalizations to be possible. In chapters 4-5 I raise a tension between publicity and another widely endorsed principle, the "Fregean constraint" (FC): subjects who are unaware of certain identity facts and find themselves in so-called "Frege cases" must have distinct concepts for the relevant object x. For instance: the ancient astronomers had distinct concepts (HESPERUS/PHOSPHORUS) for the same object (the planet Venus). First, I examine some leading theories of concepts and argue that they cannot meet both of our constraints at the same time. Then, I offer principled reasons to think that no theory can satisfy (FC) while also respecting publicity. (FC) appears to require a form of holism, on which a concept is individuated by its global inferential role in a subject S and can thus only be shared by someone who has exactly the same inferential dispositions as S. This explains the tension between publicity and (FC), since holism is clearly incompatible with concept shareability. To solve the tension, I suggest adopting my pluralist-contextualist proposal: concepts involved in Frege cases are holistically individuated and not public, while other concepts are more coarsely individuated and widely shared; given this "plurality" of concepts, we will then need contextual factors (speakers' intentions) to "select" the specific concepts to be employed in our intentional generalizations in the relevant contexts. In chapter 6 I develop the view further by contrasting it with some rival accounts. First, I examine a very different kind of pluralism about concepts, which has been recently defended by Daniel Weiskopf, and argue that it is insufficiently radical. Then, I consider the inferentialist accounts defended by authors like Peacocke, Rey and Jackson. Such views, I argue, are committed to an implausible picture of reference determination, on which our inferential dispositions fix the reference of our concepts: this leads to wrong predictions in all those cases of scientific disagreement where two parties have very different inferential dispositions and yet seem to refer to the same natural kind.