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Content

Vgl.: http://www.libreas.eu/09treude.htm. Bezug zu: Alon Friedman, Richard P. Smiraglia, (2013): Nodes and arcs: concept map, semiotics, and knowledge organization. In: Journal of Documentation, Vol. 69/1, S.27-48.

Source

LIBREAS: Library ideas. no.22, 2013, S.xx-xx

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Abstract

The concept of concept has seldom been examined in its entirety, and the term very seldom defined. The rigidity, or lack thereof, and the homogeneity, or lack thereof, of concepts, are only two of their characteristics that have been debated. These issues are reviewed in this paper, namely: 1) does a concept represent its referent(s), or is it a free creation of the mind?; 2) can a concept be analyzed in parts or elements?; 3) must a concept be general, i.e., refer to a category or a type, or can it refer to a single object, physical or mental?; 4) are concepts as clearly delimited as terms are? Are concepts voiceless terms?; and, 5) what do terms contribute to an individual's and a community's conceptual richness? As regards the relationship of concepts with their referents in the stage of formation, it seems reasonable to conclude that said relationship may be close in some concepts, less close in others, and lacking altogether in some cases. The set of elements of a concept, which varies from individual to individual and across time inside the same individual, is called the intension of a concept. The set of referents of a concept is called the extension of that concept. Most concepts don't have a clearly delimited extension: their referents form a fuzzy set. The aspects of a concept's intension form a scale of generality. A concept is not equal to the term that describes it; rather, many terms are joined to concepts. Language, therefore, renders a gamut of services to the development, consolidation, and communication of conceptual richness.

Date

22. 1.2012 13:11:25

Source

Knowledge organization. 39(2012) no.1, S.29-54

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Abstract

The aim of this paper is to analyze the Gottlob Frege's (1848-1925) theory of definition as a tool for knowledge organization. The objective was achieved by discussing the theory of definition including: the aims of definition, kinds of definition, condition of correct definition, what is undefinable. Frege indicated the following aims of a defining: (1) to introduce a new word, which has had no precise meaning until then (2) to explain the meaning of a word; (3) to catch a thought. We would like to present three kinds of definitions used by Frege: a contextual definition, a stipulative definition and a piecemeal definition. In the history of theory of definition Frege was the first to have formulated the condition of a correct definition. According to Frege not everything can be defined, what is logically simple cannot have a proper definition Usability of Frege's theory of definition is referred in the case study. Definitions that serve as an example are definitions of 'context'. The term 'context' is used in different situations and meanings in the field of knowledge organization. The paper is rounded by a discussion of how Frege's theory of definition can be useful for knowledge organization. To present G. Frege's theory of definition in view of the need for knowledge organization we shall start with different ranges of knowledge organization.

Source

Knowledge organization in the 21st century: between historical patterns and future prospects. Proceedings of the Thirteenth International ISKO Conference 19-22 May 2014, Kraków, Poland. Ed.: Wieslaw Babik

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Source

Wissensspeicher in digitalen Räumen: Nachhaltigkeit - Verfügbarkeit - semantische Interoperabilität. Proceedings der 11. Tagung der Deutschen Sektion der Internationalen Gesellschaft für Wissensorganisation, Konstanz, 20. bis 22. Februar 2008. Hrsg.: J. Sieglerschmidt u. H.P.Ohly

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Abstract

My thesis discusses two related problems that have taken center stage in the recent literature on concepts: 1) What are the individuation conditions of concepts? Under what conditions is a concept Cv(1) the same concept as a concept Cv(2)? 2) What are the possession conditions of concepts? What conditions must be satisfied for a thinker to have a concept C? The thesis defends a novel account of concepts, which I call "pluralist-contextualist": 1) Pluralism: Different concepts have different kinds of individuation and possession conditions: some concepts are individuated more "coarsely", have less demanding possession conditions and are widely shared, while other concepts are individuated more "finely" and not shared. 2) Contextualism: When a speaker ascribes a propositional attitude to a subject S, or uses his ascription to explain/predict S's behavior, the speaker's intentions in the relevant context determine the correct individuation conditions for the concepts involved in his report. In chapters 1-3 I defend a contextualist, non-Millian theory of propositional attitude ascriptions. Then, I show how contextualism can be used to offer a novel perspective on the problem of concept individuation/possession. More specifically, I employ contextualism to provide a new, more effective argument for Fodor's "publicity principle": if contextualism is true, then certain specific concepts must be shared in order for interpersonally applicable psychological generalizations to be possible. In chapters 4-5 I raise a tension between publicity and another widely endorsed principle, the "Fregean constraint" (FC): subjects who are unaware of certain identity facts and find themselves in so-called "Frege cases" must have distinct concepts for the relevant object x. For instance: the ancient astronomers had distinct concepts (HESPERUS/PHOSPHORUS) for the same object (the planet Venus). First, I examine some leading theories of concepts and argue that they cannot meet both of our constraints at the same time. Then, I offer principled reasons to think that no theory can satisfy (FC) while also respecting publicity. (FC) appears to require a form of holism, on which a concept is individuated by its global inferential role in a subject S and can thus only be shared by someone who has exactly the same inferential dispositions as S. This explains the tension between publicity and (FC), since holism is clearly incompatible with concept shareability. To solve the tension, I suggest adopting my pluralist-contextualist proposal: concepts involved in Frege cases are holistically individuated and not public, while other concepts are more coarsely individuated and widely shared; given this "plurality" of concepts, we will then need contextual factors (speakers' intentions) to "select" the specific concepts to be employed in our intentional generalizations in the relevant contexts. In chapter 6 I develop the view further by contrasting it with some rival accounts. First, I examine a very different kind of pluralism about concepts, which has been recently defended by Daniel Weiskopf, and argue that it is insufficiently radical. Then, I consider the inferentialist accounts defended by authors like Peacocke, Rey and Jackson. Such views, I argue, are committed to an implausible picture of reference determination, on which our inferential dispositions fix the reference of our concepts: this leads to wrong predictions in all those cases of scientific disagreement where two parties have very different inferential dispositions and yet seem to refer to the same natural kind.

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Isbn

978-3-518-29289-1