Search (2 results, page 1 of 1)

0.014322878 = product of:
  0.05729151 = sum of:
    0.05729151 = weight(_text_:space in 4413) [ClassicSimilarity], result of:
      0.05729151 = score(doc=4413,freq=2.0), product of:
        0.24842183 = queryWeight, product of:
          5.2183776 = idf(docFreq=650, maxDocs=44218)
          0.047605187 = queryNorm
        0.23062189 = fieldWeight in 4413, product of:
          1.4142135 = tf(freq=2.0), with freq of:
            2.0 = termFreq=2.0
          5.2183776 = idf(docFreq=650, maxDocs=44218)
          0.03125 = fieldNorm(doc=4413)
  0.25 = coord(1/4)

Abstract

What is consciousness? How do physical processes in the brain give rise to the self-aware mind and to feelings as profoundly varied as love or hate, aesthetic pleasure or spiritual yearning? These questions today are among the most hotly debated issues among scientists and philosophers, and we have seen in recent years superb volumes by such eminent figures as Francis Crick, Daniel C. Dennett, Gerald Edelman, and Roger Penrose, all firing volleys in what has come to be called the consciousness wars. Now, in The Conscious Mind, philosopher David J. Chalmers offers a cogent analysis of this heated debate as he unveils a major new theory of consciousness, one that rejects the prevailing reductionist trend of science, while offering provocative insights into the relationship between mind and brain. Writing in a rigorous, thought-provoking style, the author takes us on a far-reaching tour through the philosophical ramifications of consciousness. Chalmers convincingly reveals how contemporary cognitive science and neurobiology have failed to explain how and why mental events emerge from physiological occurrences in the brain. He proposes instead that conscious experience must be understood in an entirely new light--as an irreducible entity (similar to such physical properties as time, mass, and space) that exists at a fundamental level and cannot be understood as the sum of its parts. And after suggesting some intriguing possibilities about the structure and laws of conscious experience, he details how his unique reinterpretation of the mind could be the focus of a new science. Throughout the book, Chalmers provides fascinating thought experiments that trenchantly illustrate his ideas. For example, in exploring the notion that consciousness could be experienced by machines as well as humans, Chalmers asks us to imagine a thinking brain in which neurons are slowly replaced by silicon chips that precisely duplicate their functions--as the neurons are replaced, will consciousness gradually fade away? The book also features thoughtful discussions of how the author's theories might be practically applied to subjects as diverse as artificial intelligence and the interpretation of quantum mechanics.

0.005051205 = product of:
  0.02020482 = sum of:
    0.02020482 = product of:
      0.04040964 = sum of:
        0.04040964 = weight(_text_:model in 480) [ClassicSimilarity], result of:
          0.04040964 = score(doc=480,freq=6.0), product of:
            0.1830527 = queryWeight, product of:
              3.845226 = idf(docFreq=2569, maxDocs=44218)
              0.047605187 = queryNorm
            0.22075412 = fieldWeight in 480, product of:
              2.4494898 = tf(freq=6.0), with freq of:
                6.0 = termFreq=6.0
              3.845226 = idf(docFreq=2569, maxDocs=44218)
              0.0234375 = fieldNorm(doc=480)
      0.5 = coord(1/2)
  0.25 = coord(1/4)

Footnote

Weitere Rez. unter: https://crl.acrl.org/index.php/crl/article/view/17830/19659: "Author Charles Cole's understanding of human consciousness is built foundationally upon the work of evolutionary psychologist Merlin Donald, who visualized the development of human cognition in four phases, with three transitions. According to Donald's Theory of Mind, preceding types of cognition do not cease to exist after human cognition transitions to a new phase, but exist as four layers within the modern consciousness. Cole's narrative in the first part of the book recounts Donald's model of human cognition, categorizing episodic, mimetic, mythic, and theoretic phases of cognition. The second half of the book sets up a particular situation of consciousness using the frame theory of Marvin Minsky, uses Meno's paradox (how can we come to know that which we don't already know?) in a critique of framing as Minsky conceived it, and presents group and national level framing and shows their inherent danger in allowing information avoidance and sanctioning immoral actions. Cole concludes with a solution of information need being sparked or triggered that takes the human consciousness out of a closed information loop, driving the consciousness to seek new information.
Cole's reliance upon Donald's Theory of Mind is limiting; it represents a major weakness of the book. Donald's Theory of Mind has been an influential model in evolutionary psychology, appearing in his 1991 book Origins of the Modern Mind: Three Stages in the Evolution of Culture and Cognition (Harvard University Press). Donald's approach is a top-down, conceptual model that explicates what makes the human mind different and exceptional from other animal intelligences. However, there are other alternative, useful, science-based models of animal and human cognition that begin with a bottom-up approach to understanding the building blocks of cognition shared in common by humans and other "intelligent" animals. For example, in "A Bottom-Up Approach to the Primate Mind," Frans B.M. de Waal and Pier Francesco Ferrari note that neurophysiological studies show that specific neuron assemblies in the rat hippocampus are active during memory retrieval and that those same assemblies predict future choices. This would suggest that episodic memory and future orientation aren't as advanced a process as Donald posits in his Theory of Mind. Also, neuroimaging studies in humans show that the cortical areas active during observations of another's actions are related in position and structure to those areas identified as containing mirror neurons in macaques. Could this point to a physiological basis for imitation? ... (Scott Curtis)"