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Abstract

Cognitive load theory (CLT) is one of the most important theories in educational psychology, a highly effective guide for the design of multimedia and other learning materials. This edited volume brings together the most prolific researchers from around the world who study various aspects of cognitive load to discuss its current theoretical as well as practical issues. The book is divided into three parts. The first part describes the theoretical foundations and assumptions of CLT, the second discusses the empirical findings about the application of CLT to the design of learning environments, and the third part concludes the book with discussions and suggestions for new directions for future research. It aims to become the standard handbook in CLT for researchers and graduate students in psychology, education, and educational technology.

Content

Cognitive load theory : historical development and relation to other theories -- Cognitive load theory : recent theoretical advances -- Schema acquisition and courses of cognitive load -- Individual differences and cognitive load theory -- Learning from worked-out examples and problem solving -- Instructional control of cognitive load in the design of complex learning environments -- Techniques that reduce extraneous cognitive load and manage intrinsic cognitive load during multimedia learning -- Techniques that increase generative processing in multimedia learning : open questions for cognitive load research -- Measuring cognitive load -- From neo-behaviorism to neuroscience : perspectives on the origins and future contributions of cognitive load research -- Cognitive load in learning with multiple representations -- Current issues and open questions in cognitive load research

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Abstract

Philosophers have long debated the mind-body problem whether to attribute such mental features as consciousness to mind or to body. Meanwhile, neuroscientists search for empirical answers, seeking neural correlates for consciousness, self, and free will. In this book, Georg Northoff does not propose new solutions to the mind-body problem; instead, he questions the problem itself, arguing that it is an empirically, ontologically, and conceptually implausible way to address the existence and reality of mental features. We are better off, he contends, by addressing consciousness and other mental features in terms of the relationship between world and brain; philosophers should consider the world-brain problem rather than the mind-body problem. This calls for a Copernican shift in vantage point from within the mind or brain to beyond the brain in our consideration of mental features. Northoff, a neuroscientist, psychiatrist, and philosopher, explains that empirical evidence suggests that the brain's spontaneous activity and its spatiotemporal structure are central to aligning and integrating the brain within the world. This spatiotemporal structure allows the brain to extend beyond itself into body and world, creating the world-brain relation? that is central to mental features. Northoff makes his argument in empirical, ontological, and epistemic-methodological terms. He discusses current models of the brain and applies these models to recent data on neuronal features underlying consciousness and proposes the world-brain relation as the ontological predisposition for consciousness.

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Footnote

Originaltitel: Shadows of the mind. Rez. in: Spektrum der Wissenschaft 1996, H.8, S.118-119 (I. Diener)

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RSWK

Philosophy of Mind / Bewusstsein

Subject

Philosophy of Mind / Bewusstsein

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Footnote

Originaltitel: Consciousness: confession of a romantic reductionist.

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Abstract

Als der Neurowissenschaftler Maxwell Bennett und der Philosoph Peter Hacker 2003 den voluminösen Band Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience veröffentlichten, war dies nicht nur die erste systematische Untersuchung der begrifflichen Grundlagen der Neurowissenschaften. Es war auch der Startschuß für den bis heute intensiv geführten Kampf um die Deutungsmacht in bezug auf den menschlichen Geist. Besonders kritisch fiel seinerzeit die Auseinandersetzung der beiden Autoren mit den einflußreichen Arbeiten von Daniel Dennett und John Searle aus - also mit jenen beiden Denkern, die von der neurowissenschaftlichen Seite gerne als philosophische Gewährsmänner herangezogen werden. Mit Neurowissenschaft und Philosophie ist nun das Kunststück gelungen, die vier kongenialen »Streithähne« in einem Band zu versammeln. Im ersten Teil des Buches wird das zentrale Argument von Bennett und Hacker präsentiert, das unter anderem jene begrifflichen Verwirrungen offenlegt, denen Neurowissenschaftler allzu häufig unterliegen, wenn sie aus ihren empirischen Forschungen die bekannten weitreichenden Schlußfolgerungen etwa über das Wesen des Menschen ziehen. Der zweite und dritte Teil sind ganz der Debatte gewidmet: Auf die Einwände von Dennett und Searle folgen erneute Erwiderungen von Bennett und Hacker. Den Abschluß bildet ein kurzer Epilog von Maxwell Bennett, gerahmt wird das Ganze durch eine Einleitung und eine Schlußbetrachtung des Philosophen Daniel Robinson. Der Band zeigt vier Meister ihres Fachs in einem Duell auf höchstem Niveau, ausgetragen mit einem gehörigen Schuß Leidenschaft. Darüber hinaus bietet er eine ausgezeichnete und vor allem gut lesbare Zusammenfassung über den Stand der Dinge in einer der wichtigsten Science Battles unserer Zeit. Lebendige Wissenschaft par excellence.