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  1. Shala, E.: ¬Die Autonomie des Menschen und der Maschine : gegenwärtige Definitionen von Autonomie zwischen philosophischem Hintergrund und technologischer Umsetzbarkeit (2014) 0.20
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    Footnote
    Vgl. unter: https://www.google.de/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=2&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=2ahUKEwizweHljdbcAhVS16QKHXcFD9QQFjABegQICRAB&url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.researchgate.net%2Fpublication%2F271200105_Die_Autonomie_des_Menschen_und_der_Maschine_-_gegenwartige_Definitionen_von_Autonomie_zwischen_philosophischem_Hintergrund_und_technologischer_Umsetzbarkeit_Redigierte_Version_der_Magisterarbeit_Karls&usg=AOvVaw06orrdJmFF2xbCCp_hL26q.
  2. Francu, V.: Multilingual access to information using an intermediate language (2003) 0.00
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    Abstract
    While being theoretically so widely available, information can be restricted from a more general use by linguistic barriers. The linguistic aspects of the information languages and particularly the chances of an enhanced access to information by means of multilingual access facilities will make the substance of this thesis. The main problem of this research is thus to demonstrate that information retrieval can be improved by using multilingual thesaurus terms based on an intermediate or switching language to search with. Universal classification systems in general can play the role of switching languages for reasons dealt with in the forthcoming pages. The Universal Decimal Classification (UDC) in particular is the classification system used as example of a switching language for our objectives. The question may arise: why a universal classification system and not another thesaurus? Because the UDC like most of the classification systems uses symbols. Therefore, it is language independent and the problems of compatibility between such a thesaurus and different other thesauri in different languages are avoided. Another question may still arise? Why not then, assign running numbers to the descriptors in a thesaurus and make a switching language out of the resulting enumerative system? Because of some other characteristics of the UDC: hierarchical structure and terminological richness, consistency and control. One big problem to find an answer to is: can a thesaurus be made having as a basis a classification system in any and all its parts? To what extent this question can be given an affirmative answer? This depends much on the attributes of the universal classification system which can be favourably used to this purpose. Examples of different situations will be given and discussed upon beginning with those classes of UDC which are best fitted for building a thesaurus structure out of them (classes which are both hierarchical and faceted)...
  3. Onofri, A.: Concepts in context (2013) 0.00
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    Abstract
    My thesis discusses two related problems that have taken center stage in the recent literature on concepts: 1) What are the individuation conditions of concepts? Under what conditions is a concept Cv(1) the same concept as a concept Cv(2)? 2) What are the possession conditions of concepts? What conditions must be satisfied for a thinker to have a concept C? The thesis defends a novel account of concepts, which I call "pluralist-contextualist": 1) Pluralism: Different concepts have different kinds of individuation and possession conditions: some concepts are individuated more "coarsely", have less demanding possession conditions and are widely shared, while other concepts are individuated more "finely" and not shared. 2) Contextualism: When a speaker ascribes a propositional attitude to a subject S, or uses his ascription to explain/predict S's behavior, the speaker's intentions in the relevant context determine the correct individuation conditions for the concepts involved in his report. In chapters 1-3 I defend a contextualist, non-Millian theory of propositional attitude ascriptions. Then, I show how contextualism can be used to offer a novel perspective on the problem of concept individuation/possession. More specifically, I employ contextualism to provide a new, more effective argument for Fodor's "publicity principle": if contextualism is true, then certain specific concepts must be shared in order for interpersonally applicable psychological generalizations to be possible. In chapters 4-5 I raise a tension between publicity and another widely endorsed principle, the "Fregean constraint" (FC): subjects who are unaware of certain identity facts and find themselves in so-called "Frege cases" must have distinct concepts for the relevant object x. For instance: the ancient astronomers had distinct concepts (HESPERUS/PHOSPHORUS) for the same object (the planet Venus). First, I examine some leading theories of concepts and argue that they cannot meet both of our constraints at the same time. Then, I offer principled reasons to think that no theory can satisfy (FC) while also respecting publicity. (FC) appears to require a form of holism, on which a concept is individuated by its global inferential role in a subject S and can thus only be shared by someone who has exactly the same inferential dispositions as S. This explains the tension between publicity and (FC), since holism is clearly incompatible with concept shareability. To solve the tension, I suggest adopting my pluralist-contextualist proposal: concepts involved in Frege cases are holistically individuated and not public, while other concepts are more coarsely individuated and widely shared; given this "plurality" of concepts, we will then need contextual factors (speakers' intentions) to "select" the specific concepts to be employed in our intentional generalizations in the relevant contexts. In chapter 6 I develop the view further by contrasting it with some rival accounts. First, I examine a very different kind of pluralism about concepts, which has been recently defended by Daniel Weiskopf, and argue that it is insufficiently radical. Then, I consider the inferentialist accounts defended by authors like Peacocke, Rey and Jackson. Such views, I argue, are committed to an implausible picture of reference determination, on which our inferential dispositions fix the reference of our concepts: this leads to wrong predictions in all those cases of scientific disagreement where two parties have very different inferential dispositions and yet seem to refer to the same natural kind.