Search (10 results, page 1 of 1)

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Abstract

Purpose - The purpose of this paper is to explore the basics of semiotic analysis and concept theory that represent two dominant approaches to knowledge representation, and explore how these approaches are fruitful for knowledge organization. Design/methodology/approach - In particular the semiotic theory formulated by the American philosopher C.S. Peirce and the concept theory formulated by Ingetraut Dahlberg are investigated. The paper compares the differences and similarities between these two theories of knowledge representation. Findings - The semiotic model is a general and unrestricted model of signs and Dahlberg's model is thought from the perspective and demand of better knowledge organization system (KOS) development. It is found that Dahlberg's concept model provides a detailed method for analyzing and representing concepts in a KOS, where semiotics provides the philosophical context for representation. Originality/value - This paper is the first to combine theories of knowledge representation, semiotic and concept theory, within the context of knowledge organization.

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Abstract

The aim of this paper is to analyze the Gottlob Frege's (1848-1925) theory of definition as a tool for knowledge organization. The objective was achieved by discussing the theory of definition including: the aims of definition, kinds of definition, condition of correct definition, what is undefinable. Frege indicated the following aims of a defining: (1) to introduce a new word, which has had no precise meaning until then (2) to explain the meaning of a word; (3) to catch a thought. We would like to present three kinds of definitions used by Frege: a contextual definition, a stipulative definition and a piecemeal definition. In the history of theory of definition Frege was the first to have formulated the condition of a correct definition. According to Frege not everything can be defined, what is logically simple cannot have a proper definition Usability of Frege's theory of definition is referred in the case study. Definitions that serve as an example are definitions of 'context'. The term 'context' is used in different situations and meanings in the field of knowledge organization. The paper is rounded by a discussion of how Frege's theory of definition can be useful for knowledge organization. To present G. Frege's theory of definition in view of the need for knowledge organization we shall start with different ranges of knowledge organization.

Source

Knowledge organization in the 21st century: between historical patterns and future prospects. Proceedings of the Thirteenth International ISKO Conference 19-22 May 2014, Kraków, Poland. Ed.: Wieslaw Babik

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Abstract

Much of the literature of information science and knowledge organization has accepted and built upon Elaine Svenonius's (2004) claim that "paradigmatic relationships are those that are context-free, definitional, and true in all possible worlds" (p. 583). At the same time, the literature demonstrates a common understanding that paradigmatic relations are the kinds of semantic relations used in thesauri and other knowledge organization systems (including equivalence relations, hierarchical relations, and associative relations). This understanding is problematic and harmful because it directs attention away from the empirical and contextual basis for knowledge-organizing systems. Whether A is a kind of X is certainly not context-free and definitional in empirical sciences or in much everyday information. Semantic relations are theory-dependent and, in biology, for example, a scientific revolution has taken place in which many relations have changed following the new taxonomic paradigm named "cladism." This biological example is not an exception, but the norm. Semantic relations including paradigmatic relations are not a priori but are dependent on subject knowledge, scientific findings, and paradigms. As long as information scientists and knowledge organizers isolate themselves from subject knowledge, knowledge organization cannot possibly progress.

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Abstract

Despite having the principle of provenance as its guiding element, the archival knowledge organization still prescinds, for conceptual purposes, of greater clarity of its object-the archival knowledge-a fundamental aspect for the sedimentation of the archival studies and of its discursive community in the scope of KO. This article aims to define a conceptual framework to archival knowledge by using Dahlberg's concept theory. In this vein, it established the nominal concept or definiendum-archival knowledge-seeking to analyze its real definition, composed by three inseparable definiens: the concept of fonds, the knowledge of documentary form and the knowledge of document creation context. At the end, it demonstrates that archival knowledge can be defined as being a reunion of three indivisible facets in which the archival bond will be contemplated.

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Abstract

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to discuss the literature on concept theory in library and information science (LIS) from an epistemological perspective, ascribing each paper to an epistemological family and discussing their relevance in the context of the knowledge organization (KO) domain. Design/methodology/approach This paper adopts a hermeneutic approach for the analysis of the texts that compose the corpus of study following contingency and categorical analyses. More specifically, the paper works with Bardin's contingency analysis and follows Hjørland's families of epistemologies for the categorization. Findings The analysis corroborates the observations made for the last ten years about the scarcity of studies on concept theory in LIS and KO. However, the study also reveals an epistemological turn on concept theory since 2009 that could be considered a departure from the rationalist views that dominated the field and a continuation of a broader paradigm shift in LIS and KO. All analyzed papers except two follow pragmatist or historicist approaches. Originality/value This paper follows-up and systematizes the contributions to the LIS and KO fields on concept theory mainly during the last decade. The epistemological analysis reveals the dominant views in this paradigm shift and the main authors and trends that are present in the LIS literature on concept theory.

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Abstract

My thesis discusses two related problems that have taken center stage in the recent literature on concepts: 1) What are the individuation conditions of concepts? Under what conditions is a concept Cv(1) the same concept as a concept Cv(2)? 2) What are the possession conditions of concepts? What conditions must be satisfied for a thinker to have a concept C? The thesis defends a novel account of concepts, which I call "pluralist-contextualist": 1) Pluralism: Different concepts have different kinds of individuation and possession conditions: some concepts are individuated more "coarsely", have less demanding possession conditions and are widely shared, while other concepts are individuated more "finely" and not shared. 2) Contextualism: When a speaker ascribes a propositional attitude to a subject S, or uses his ascription to explain/predict S's behavior, the speaker's intentions in the relevant context determine the correct individuation conditions for the concepts involved in his report. In chapters 1-3 I defend a contextualist, non-Millian theory of propositional attitude ascriptions. Then, I show how contextualism can be used to offer a novel perspective on the problem of concept individuation/possession. More specifically, I employ contextualism to provide a new, more effective argument for Fodor's "publicity principle": if contextualism is true, then certain specific concepts must be shared in order for interpersonally applicable psychological generalizations to be possible. In chapters 4-5 I raise a tension between publicity and another widely endorsed principle, the "Fregean constraint" (FC): subjects who are unaware of certain identity facts and find themselves in so-called "Frege cases" must have distinct concepts for the relevant object x. For instance: the ancient astronomers had distinct concepts (HESPERUS/PHOSPHORUS) for the same object (the planet Venus). First, I examine some leading theories of concepts and argue that they cannot meet both of our constraints at the same time. Then, I offer principled reasons to think that no theory can satisfy (FC) while also respecting publicity. (FC) appears to require a form of holism, on which a concept is individuated by its global inferential role in a subject S and can thus only be shared by someone who has exactly the same inferential dispositions as S. This explains the tension between publicity and (FC), since holism is clearly incompatible with concept shareability. To solve the tension, I suggest adopting my pluralist-contextualist proposal: concepts involved in Frege cases are holistically individuated and not public, while other concepts are more coarsely individuated and widely shared; given this "plurality" of concepts, we will then need contextual factors (speakers' intentions) to "select" the specific concepts to be employed in our intentional generalizations in the relevant contexts. In chapter 6 I develop the view further by contrasting it with some rival accounts. First, I examine a very different kind of pluralism about concepts, which has been recently defended by Daniel Weiskopf, and argue that it is insufficiently radical. Then, I consider the inferentialist accounts defended by authors like Peacocke, Rey and Jackson. Such views, I argue, are committed to an implausible picture of reference determination, on which our inferential dispositions fix the reference of our concepts: this leads to wrong predictions in all those cases of scientific disagreement where two parties have very different inferential dispositions and yet seem to refer to the same natural kind.

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Date

22. 1.2012 13:11:25

Source

Knowledge organization. 39(2012) no.1, S.29-54

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Date

28. 2.2017 13:29:03

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Source

Wissensspeicher in digitalen Räumen: Nachhaltigkeit - Verfügbarkeit - semantische Interoperabilität. Proceedings der 11. Tagung der Deutschen Sektion der Internationalen Gesellschaft für Wissensorganisation, Konstanz, 20. bis 22. Februar 2008. Hrsg.: J. Sieglerschmidt u. H.P.Ohly

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Source

LIBREAS: Library ideas. no.22, 2013, S.xx-xx