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Footnote

Vgl. auch: http://www.zeit.de/2004/43/C-Enzyklop_8adien-Test.

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Footnote

Gewisse Themen können Hofstadters Zorn erregen, zum Beispiel die Diskussion über das so genannte inverted spectrum paradox. Wie kann ich sicher sein, dass ein anderer Mensch das, was ich als Rot erlebe, genauso erlebt wie ich und nicht etwa eine Empfindung hat, die ich als Blau bezeichnen würde? Oder das Konzept vom Zombie, einem Wesen, das sich in jeder Hinsicht so verhält wie ein gewöhnlicher Mensch, dem aber alle menschlichen Gefühle fehlen. Oder Bewusstsein und freier Wille. Hofstadter hält beides für Illusionen, für Trugbilder gleich der Murmel im Briefumschlagstapel, allerdings für unvermeidbare, machtvolle Trugbilder. Wir erleben, dass ein Ich in unserem Schädel steckt, aber das ist nur eine Illusion, die von Millionen kleiner Schleifen erzeugt wird, »einem Schwarm bunter Schmetterlinge in einem Obstgarten«. An dieser Stelle ist Hofstadter anderer Meinung als sein Freund, der Philosoph Daniel C. Dennett (mit dem zusammen er das Buch »The Mind's I«, deutsch »Einsicht ins lch«, herausgegeben hat). Aber wie Den-nett, der einem seiner Werke den dreisten Titel »Consciousness Explained« gab, glaubt er, er habe das Bewusstsein erklärt. Das stimmt leider nicht. Beide haben das Bewusstsein nur beschrieben. Einen Regenbogen zu beschreiben ist einfach, ihn zu erklären ist nicht so einfach. Bewusstsein zu beschreiben ist einfach, aber das Wunder zu erklären, durch das ein Haufen Moleküle es hervorbringt, ist nicht so einfach. Ich will meine Karten auf den Tisch legen. Ich gehöre zu der kleinen Gruppe der »Mysterianer«, zu denen auch die Philosophen John R. Searle (der Schurke in Hofstadters Buch), Thomas Nagel, Colin McGinn und Jerry Fodor sowie der Linguist Noam Chomsky, der Mathematiker Roger Penrose und einige andere zählen. Wir sind der Überzeugung, dass kein heute lebender Philosoph oder Naturwissenschaftler auch nur die nebelhafteste Ahnung davon hat, wie Bewusstsein und sein unzertrennlicher Begleiter, der freie Wille, aus einem materiellen Gehirn entstehen (was sie zweifellos tun). Wir sind überzeugt, dass kein Computer, wie wir ihn heute kennen - das heißt, der aus Schaltern und Verbindungsdrähten gebaut ist -, je ein Bewusstsein dessen erlangen wird, was er tut. Das stärkste Schachprogramm wird nicht wissen, dass es Schach spielt, ebenso wenig wie eine Waschmaschine weiß, dass sie Wäsche wäscht.

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Footnote

This book covers all of the primary areas in the DL Curriculum as suggested by T. Saracevic and M. Dalbello's (2001) and A. Spink and C. Cool's (1999) D-Lib articles an DL education. In fact, the book's coverage is quite broad; it includes a Superset of recommended topics, offering a chapter an professional issues (recommended in Spink and Cool) as well as three chapters devoted to DL research. The book comes with a comprehensive list of references and an index, allowing readers to easily locate a specific topic or research project of interest. Each chapter also begins with a short outline of the chapter. As an additional plus, the book is quite heavily Cross-referenced, allowing easy navigation across topics. The only drawback with regard to supplementary materials is that it Lacks a glossary that world be a helpful reference to students needing a reference guide to DL terminology. The book's organization is well thought out and each chapter stands independently of the others, facilitating instruction by parts. While not officially delineated into three parts, the book's fifteen chapters are logically organized as such. Chapters 2 and 3 form the first part, which surveys various DLs and DL research initiatives. The second and core part of the book examines the workings of a DL along various dimensions, from its design to its eventual implementation and deployment. The third part brings together extended topics that relate to a deployed DL: its preservation, evaluation, and relationship to the larger social content. Chapter 1 defines digital libraries and discusses the scope of the materials covered in the book. The authors posit that the meaning of digital library is best explained by its sample characteristics rather than by definition, noting that it has largely been shaped by the melding of the research and information professions. This reveals two primary facets of the DL: an "emphasis an digital content" coming from an engineering and computer science perspective as well as an "emphasis an services" coming from library and information professionals (pp. 4-5). The book's organization mirrors this dichotomy, focusing an the core aspects of content in the earlier chapters and retuming to the service perspective in later chapters.

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Footnote

Chapter 2 (Technology and People) focuses an several theories of technological acceptance and diffusion. Unfortunately, Bruce's presentation is somewhat confusing as he moves from one theory to next, never quite connecting them into a logical sequence or coherent whole. Two theories are of particular interest to Bruce: the Theory of Diffusion of Innovations and the Theory of Planned Behavior. The Theory of Diffusion of Innovations is an "information-centric view of technology acceptance" in which technology adopters are placed in the information flows of society from which they learn about innovations and "drive innovation adoption decisions" (p. 20). The Theory of Planned Behavior maintains that the "performance of a behavior is a joint function of intentions and perceived behavioral control" (i.e., how muck control a person thinks they have) (pp. 22-23). Bruce combines these two theories to form the basis for the Technology Acceptance Model. This model posits that "an individual's acceptance of information technology is based an beliefs, attitudes, intentions, and behaviors" (p. 24). In all these theories and models echoes a recurring theme: "individual perceptions of the innovation or technology are critical" in terms of both its characteristics and its use (pp. 24-25). From these, in turn, Bruce derives a predictive theory of the role personal perceptions play in technology adoption: Personal Innovativeness of Information Technology Adoption (PIITA). Personal inventiveness is defined as "the willingness of an individual to try out any new information technology" (p. 26). In general, the PIITA theory predicts that information technology will be adopted by individuals that have a greater exposure to mass media, rely less an the evaluation of information technology by others, exhibit a greater ability to cope with uncertainty and take risks, and requires a less positive perception of an information technology prior to its adoption. Chapter 3 (A Focus an Usings) introduces the User-Centered Paradigm (UCP). The UCP is characteristic of the shift of emphasis from technology to users as the driving force behind technology and research agendas for Internet development [for a dissenting view, see Andrew Dillion's (2003) challenge to the utility of user-centerness for design guidance]. It entails the "broad acceptance of the user-oriented perspective across a range of disciplines and professional fields," such as business, education, cognitive engineering, and information science (p. 34).