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Abstract

My thesis discusses two related problems that have taken center stage in the recent literature on concepts: 1) What are the individuation conditions of concepts? Under what conditions is a concept Cv(1) the same concept as a concept Cv(2)? 2) What are the possession conditions of concepts? What conditions must be satisfied for a thinker to have a concept C? The thesis defends a novel account of concepts, which I call "pluralist-contextualist": 1) Pluralism: Different concepts have different kinds of individuation and possession conditions: some concepts are individuated more "coarsely", have less demanding possession conditions and are widely shared, while other concepts are individuated more "finely" and not shared. 2) Contextualism: When a speaker ascribes a propositional attitude to a subject S, or uses his ascription to explain/predict S's behavior, the speaker's intentions in the relevant context determine the correct individuation conditions for the concepts involved in his report. In chapters 1-3 I defend a contextualist, non-Millian theory of propositional attitude ascriptions. Then, I show how contextualism can be used to offer a novel perspective on the problem of concept individuation/possession. More specifically, I employ contextualism to provide a new, more effective argument for Fodor's "publicity principle": if contextualism is true, then certain specific concepts must be shared in order for interpersonally applicable psychological generalizations to be possible. In chapters 4-5 I raise a tension between publicity and another widely endorsed principle, the "Fregean constraint" (FC): subjects who are unaware of certain identity facts and find themselves in so-called "Frege cases" must have distinct concepts for the relevant object x. For instance: the ancient astronomers had distinct concepts (HESPERUS/PHOSPHORUS) for the same object (the planet Venus). First, I examine some leading theories of concepts and argue that they cannot meet both of our constraints at the same time. Then, I offer principled reasons to think that no theory can satisfy (FC) while also respecting publicity. (FC) appears to require a form of holism, on which a concept is individuated by its global inferential role in a subject S and can thus only be shared by someone who has exactly the same inferential dispositions as S. This explains the tension between publicity and (FC), since holism is clearly incompatible with concept shareability. To solve the tension, I suggest adopting my pluralist-contextualist proposal: concepts involved in Frege cases are holistically individuated and not public, while other concepts are more coarsely individuated and widely shared; given this "plurality" of concepts, we will then need contextual factors (speakers' intentions) to "select" the specific concepts to be employed in our intentional generalizations in the relevant contexts. In chapter 6 I develop the view further by contrasting it with some rival accounts. First, I examine a very different kind of pluralism about concepts, which has been recently defended by Daniel Weiskopf, and argue that it is insufficiently radical. Then, I consider the inferentialist accounts defended by authors like Peacocke, Rey and Jackson. Such views, I argue, are committed to an implausible picture of reference determination, on which our inferential dispositions fix the reference of our concepts: this leads to wrong predictions in all those cases of scientific disagreement where two parties have very different inferential dispositions and yet seem to refer to the same natural kind.

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Abstract

This paper present an alternative approach to knowledge organization based on semiotic reasoning. The semantic distance between domain specific terminology and KOS is analyzed by means of their different sign systems. It is argued that a faceted approach may provide the means needed to minimize the gap between knowledge domains and KOS.

Source

Knowledge organization for a global learning society: Proceedings of the 9th International ISKO Conference, 4-7 July 2006, Vienna, Austria. Hrsg.: G. Budin, C. Swertz u. K. Mitgutsch

Type

a

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Abstract

Several instruments of knowledge organization will reflect different possibilities for information retrieval. In this context, ontologies have a different potential because they allow knowledge discovery, which can be used to retrieve information in a more flexible way. However, this potential can be affected by the theoretical principles adopted in ontology building. The aim of this paper is to discuss, in an introductory way, how a (not exhaustive) set of theoretical principles can influence an aspect of ontologies: their use to obtain inferences. In this context, the role of Ingetraut Dahlberg's Theory of Concept is discussed. The methodology is exploratory, qualitative, and from the technical point of view it uses bibliographic research supported by the content analysis method. It also presents a small example of application as a proof of concept. As results, a discussion about the influence of conceptual definition on subsumption inferences is presented, theoretical contributions are suggested that should be used to guide the formation of hierarchical structures on which such inferences are supported, and examples are provided of how the absence of such contributions can lead to erroneous inferences

Type

a

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Abstract

In this chapter I propose that frames provide the fundamental representation of knowledge in human cognition. In the first section, I raise problems with the feature list representations often found in theories of knowledge, and I sketch the solutions that frames provide to them. In the second section, I examine the three fundamental concepts of frames: attribute-value sets, structural invariants, and constraints. Because frames also represents the attributes, values, structural invariants, and constraints within a frame, the mechanism that constructs frames builds them recursively. The frame theory I propose borrows heavily from previous frame theories, although its collection of representational components is somewhat unique. Furthermore, frame theorists generally assume that frames are rigid configurations of independent attributes, whereas I propose that frames are dynamic relational structures whose form is flexible and context dependent. In the third section, I illustrate how frames support a wide variety of representational tasks central to conceptual processing in natural and artificial intelligence. Frames can represent exemplars and propositions, prototypes and membership, subordinates and taxonomies. Frames can also represent conceptual combinations, event sequences, rules, and plans. In the fourth section, I show how frames define the extent of conceptual fields and how they provide a powerful productive mechanism for generating specific concepts within a field.

Source

Frames, fields and contrasts: new essays in semantic and lexical organization. Eds.: A. Lehrer u. E.F. Kittay

Type

a

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Abstract

The ontological approach in the development of KOS is an attempt to overcome the limitations of the traditional epistemological approach. Questions raise about the representation and organization of ontologically-oriented KO units, such as BFO universals or ILC phenomena. The study aims to compare the ontological approaches of BFO and ILC using a hermeneutic approach. We found that the differences between the units of the two systems are primarily due to the formal level of abstraction of BFO and the different organizations, namely the grouping of phenomena into ILC classes that represent complex compounds of entities in the BFO approach. In both systems the use of concepts is considered instrumental, although in the ILC they constitute the intersubjective component of the phenomena whereas in BFO they serve to access the entities of reality but are not part of them.

Type

a

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a

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Abstract

This standard provides the basic terms and their definitions in the field of information and documentation for the purpose of promoting and facilitating knowledge sharing and information exchange. This International Standard presents terms and definitions of selected concepts relevant to the field of information and documentation. If a definition is from other standards, the priority of selection is TC46 technical standards, then technical standards in relevant field, and then terminology related standards. The scope of this International Standard corresponds to that of ISO/TC46, Standardization of practices relating to libraries, documentation and information centres, publishing, archives, records management, museum documentation, indexing and abstracting services, and information science. ISO 5127 was prepared by Technical Committee ISO/TC 46, Information and Documentation, WG4, Terminology of information and documentation. This second edition cancels and replaces the first edition (ISO 5127:2001), which has been technically revised to overcome problems in the practical application of ISO 5127:2001 and to take account of the new developments in the field of information and documentation.