Search (6 results, page 1 of 1)

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Classification

Med C 991 / Höhere Nerventätigkeit
Med C 968 / Neurophysiologie

SBB

Med C 991 / Höhere Nerventätigkeit
Med C 968 / Neurophysiologie

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Footnote

Rez. in: JASIST 71(2020) no.1, S.118-120 (Heidi Julien). - Vgl. auch den Beitrag: Cole, C.: A rebuttal of the book review of the book titled "The Consciousness' Drive: Information Need and the Search for Meaning": mapping cognitive and document spaces. In: Journal of the Association for Information Science and Technology. 71(2020) no.2, S.242.

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Abstract

What is consciousness? How do physical processes in the brain give rise to the self-aware mind and to feelings as profoundly varied as love or hate, aesthetic pleasure or spiritual yearning? These questions today are among the most hotly debated issues among scientists and philosophers, and we have seen in recent years superb volumes by such eminent figures as Francis Crick, Daniel C. Dennett, Gerald Edelman, and Roger Penrose, all firing volleys in what has come to be called the consciousness wars. Now, in The Conscious Mind, philosopher David J. Chalmers offers a cogent analysis of this heated debate as he unveils a major new theory of consciousness, one that rejects the prevailing reductionist trend of science, while offering provocative insights into the relationship between mind and brain. Writing in a rigorous, thought-provoking style, the author takes us on a far-reaching tour through the philosophical ramifications of consciousness. Chalmers convincingly reveals how contemporary cognitive science and neurobiology have failed to explain how and why mental events emerge from physiological occurrences in the brain. He proposes instead that conscious experience must be understood in an entirely new light--as an irreducible entity (similar to such physical properties as time, mass, and space) that exists at a fundamental level and cannot be understood as the sum of its parts. And after suggesting some intriguing possibilities about the structure and laws of conscious experience, he details how his unique reinterpretation of the mind could be the focus of a new science. Throughout the book, Chalmers provides fascinating thought experiments that trenchantly illustrate his ideas. For example, in exploring the notion that consciousness could be experienced by machines as well as humans, Chalmers asks us to imagine a thinking brain in which neurons are slowly replaced by silicon chips that precisely duplicate their functions--as the neurons are replaced, will consciousness gradually fade away? The book also features thoughtful discussions of how the author's theories might be practically applied to subjects as diverse as artificial intelligence and the interpretation of quantum mechanics.

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Footnote

Erwiderung von C. Koch u. G. Tononi in: The New York Review of Books, 07.03.2013 [https://www.nybooks.com/articles/2013/03/07/can-photodiode-be-conscious/?pagination=false&printpage=true] mit einer weiteren Erwiderung von J. Searle.

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Footnote

Gewisse Themen können Hofstadters Zorn erregen, zum Beispiel die Diskussion über das so genannte inverted spectrum paradox. Wie kann ich sicher sein, dass ein anderer Mensch das, was ich als Rot erlebe, genauso erlebt wie ich und nicht etwa eine Empfindung hat, die ich als Blau bezeichnen würde? Oder das Konzept vom Zombie, einem Wesen, das sich in jeder Hinsicht so verhält wie ein gewöhnlicher Mensch, dem aber alle menschlichen Gefühle fehlen. Oder Bewusstsein und freier Wille. Hofstadter hält beides für Illusionen, für Trugbilder gleich der Murmel im Briefumschlagstapel, allerdings für unvermeidbare, machtvolle Trugbilder. Wir erleben, dass ein Ich in unserem Schädel steckt, aber das ist nur eine Illusion, die von Millionen kleiner Schleifen erzeugt wird, »einem Schwarm bunter Schmetterlinge in einem Obstgarten«. An dieser Stelle ist Hofstadter anderer Meinung als sein Freund, der Philosoph Daniel C. Dennett (mit dem zusammen er das Buch »The Mind's I«, deutsch »Einsicht ins lch«, herausgegeben hat). Aber wie Den-nett, der einem seiner Werke den dreisten Titel »Consciousness Explained« gab, glaubt er, er habe das Bewusstsein erklärt. Das stimmt leider nicht. Beide haben das Bewusstsein nur beschrieben. Einen Regenbogen zu beschreiben ist einfach, ihn zu erklären ist nicht so einfach. Bewusstsein zu beschreiben ist einfach, aber das Wunder zu erklären, durch das ein Haufen Moleküle es hervorbringt, ist nicht so einfach. Ich will meine Karten auf den Tisch legen. Ich gehöre zu der kleinen Gruppe der »Mysterianer«, zu denen auch die Philosophen John R. Searle (der Schurke in Hofstadters Buch), Thomas Nagel, Colin McGinn und Jerry Fodor sowie der Linguist Noam Chomsky, der Mathematiker Roger Penrose und einige andere zählen. Wir sind der Überzeugung, dass kein heute lebender Philosoph oder Naturwissenschaftler auch nur die nebelhafteste Ahnung davon hat, wie Bewusstsein und sein unzertrennlicher Begleiter, der freie Wille, aus einem materiellen Gehirn entstehen (was sie zweifellos tun). Wir sind überzeugt, dass kein Computer, wie wir ihn heute kennen - das heißt, der aus Schaltern und Verbindungsdrähten gebaut ist -, je ein Bewusstsein dessen erlangen wird, was er tut. Das stärkste Schachprogramm wird nicht wissen, dass es Schach spielt, ebenso wenig wie eine Waschmaschine weiß, dass sie Wäsche wäscht.