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  • × subject_ss:"Consciousness"
  1. Koch, C.: Consciousness : confessions of a romantic reductionist (2012) 0.01
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    Content
    In which I introduce the ancient mind-body problem, explain why I am on a quest to use reason and empirical inquiry to solve it, acquaint you with Francis Crick, explain how he relates to this quest, make a confession, and end on a sad note -- In which I write about the wellsprings of my inner conflict between religion and reason, why I grew up wanting to be a scientist, why I wear a lapel pin of Professor Calculus, and how I acquired a second mentor late in life -- In which I explain why consciousness challenges the scientific view of the world, how consciousness can be investigated empirically with both feet firmly planted on the ground, why animals share consciousness with humans, and why self-consciousness is not as important as many people think it is -- In which you hear tales of scientist-magicians that make you look but not see, how they track the footprints of consciousness by peering into your skull, why you don't see with your eyes, and why attention and consciousness are not the same -- In which you learn from neurologists and neurosurgeons that some neurons care a great deal about celebrities, that cutting the cerebral cortex in two does not reduce consciousness by half, that color is leached from the world by the loss of a small cortical region, and that the destruction of a sugar cube-sized chunk of brain stem or thalamic tissue leaves you undead -- In which I defend two propositions that my younger self found nonsense--you are unaware of most of the things that go on in your head, and zombie agents control much of your life, even though you confidently believe that you are in charge -- In which I throw caution to the wind, bring up free will, Der ring des Nibelungen, and what physics says about determinism, explain the impoverished ability of your mind to choose, show that your will lags behind your brain's decision, and that freedom is just another word for feeling -- In which I argue that consciousness is a fundamental property of complex things, rhapsodize about integrated information theory, how it explains many puzzling facts about consciousness and provides a blueprint for building sentient machines -- In which I outline an electromagnetic gadget to measure consciousness, describe efforts to harness the power of genetic engineering to track consciousness in mice, and find myself building cortical observatories -- In which I muse about final matters considered off-limits to polite scientific discourse: to wit, the relationship between science and religion, the existence of God, whether this God can intervene in the universe, the death of my mentor, and my recent tribulations.
    Footnote
    Now it might seem that is a fairly well-defined scientific task: just figure out how the brain does it. In the end I think that is the right attitude to have. But our peculiar history makes it difficult to have exactly that attitude-to take consciousness as a biological phenomenon like digestion or photosynthesis, and figure out how exactly it works as a biological phenomenon. Two philosophical obstacles cast a shadow over the whole subject. The first is the tradition of God, the soul, and immortality. Consciousness is not a part of the ordinary biological world of digestion and photosynthesis: it is part of a spiritual world. It is sometimes thought to be a property of the soul and the soul is definitely not a part of the physical world. The other tradition, almost as misleading, is a certain conception of Science with a capital "S." Science is said to be "reductionist" and "materialist," and so construed there is no room for consciousness in Science. If it really exists, consciousness must really be something else. It must be reducible to something else, such as neuron firings, computer programs running in the brain, or dispositions to behavior. There are also a number of purely technical difficulties to neurobiological research. The brain is an extremely complicated mechanism with about a hundred billion neurons in ... (Rest nicht frei). " [https://www.nybooks.com/articles/2013/01/10/can-information-theory-explain-consciousness/].
  2. Penfield, W.: ¬The mystery of the mind : a critical study of consciousness and the human brain (1975) 0.01
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    Abstract
    In the past fifty years scientists have begun to discover how the human brain functions. In this book Wilder Penfield, whose work has been at the forefront of such research, describes the current state of knowledge about the brain and asks to what extent recent findings explain the action of the mind. He offers the general reader a glimpse of exciting discoveries usually accessible to only a few scientists. He writes: "Throughout my own scientific career I, like other scientists, have struggled to prove that the brain accounts for the mind. But perhaps the time has come when we may profitably consider the evidence as it stands, and ask the question . . . Can the mind be explained by what is now known about the brain?" The central question, he points out, is whether man's being is determined by his body alone or by mind and body as separate elements. Before suggesting an answer, he gives a fascinating account of his experience as a neurosurgeon and scientist observing the brain in conscious patients.
  3. Hofstadter, D.R.: I am a strange loop (2007) 0.01
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    Abstract
    For more than 25 years, Hofstadter has been explaining the mystery of human consciousness through a bold fusion of mathematical logic and cognitive science. Yet for all of the acclaim his fusion has garnered (including the Pulitzer for his Godel, Escher, Bach, 1979), this pioneer admits that few readers have really grasped its meaning. To dispel the lingering incomprehension, Hofstadter here amplifies his revolutionary conception of the mind. A repudiation of traditional dualism--in which a spirit or soul inhabits the body--this revolutionary conception defines the mind as the emergence of a neural feedback loop within the brain. It is this peculiar loop that allows a stream of cognitive symbols to twist back on itself, so creating the self-awareness and self-integration that constitute an "I." Hofstadter explains the dynamics of this reflective self in refreshingly lucid language, enlivened with personal anecdotes that translate arcane formulas into the wagging tail on a golden retriever or the smile on Hopalong Cassidy. Nonspecialists are thus able to assess the divide between human and animal minds, and even to plumb the mental links binding the living to the dead. Hofstadter's analysis will not convince all skeptics. But even skeptics will appreciate the way he forces us to think deeper thoughts about thought.
    Footnote
    Gewisse Themen können Hofstadters Zorn erregen, zum Beispiel die Diskussion über das so genannte inverted spectrum paradox. Wie kann ich sicher sein, dass ein anderer Mensch das, was ich als Rot erlebe, genauso erlebt wie ich und nicht etwa eine Empfindung hat, die ich als Blau bezeichnen würde? Oder das Konzept vom Zombie, einem Wesen, das sich in jeder Hinsicht so verhält wie ein gewöhnlicher Mensch, dem aber alle menschlichen Gefühle fehlen. Oder Bewusstsein und freier Wille. Hofstadter hält beides für Illusionen, für Trugbilder gleich der Murmel im Briefumschlagstapel, allerdings für unvermeidbare, machtvolle Trugbilder. Wir erleben, dass ein Ich in unserem Schädel steckt, aber das ist nur eine Illusion, die von Millionen kleiner Schleifen erzeugt wird, »einem Schwarm bunter Schmetterlinge in einem Obstgarten«. An dieser Stelle ist Hofstadter anderer Meinung als sein Freund, der Philosoph Daniel C. Dennett (mit dem zusammen er das Buch »The Mind's I«, deutsch »Einsicht ins lch«, herausgegeben hat). Aber wie Den-nett, der einem seiner Werke den dreisten Titel »Consciousness Explained« gab, glaubt er, er habe das Bewusstsein erklärt. Das stimmt leider nicht. Beide haben das Bewusstsein nur beschrieben. Einen Regenbogen zu beschreiben ist einfach, ihn zu erklären ist nicht so einfach. Bewusstsein zu beschreiben ist einfach, aber das Wunder zu erklären, durch das ein Haufen Moleküle es hervorbringt, ist nicht so einfach. Ich will meine Karten auf den Tisch legen. Ich gehöre zu der kleinen Gruppe der »Mysterianer«, zu denen auch die Philosophen John R. Searle (der Schurke in Hofstadters Buch), Thomas Nagel, Colin McGinn und Jerry Fodor sowie der Linguist Noam Chomsky, der Mathematiker Roger Penrose und einige andere zählen. Wir sind der Überzeugung, dass kein heute lebender Philosoph oder Naturwissenschaftler auch nur die nebelhafteste Ahnung davon hat, wie Bewusstsein und sein unzertrennlicher Begleiter, der freie Wille, aus einem materiellen Gehirn entstehen (was sie zweifellos tun). Wir sind überzeugt, dass kein Computer, wie wir ihn heute kennen - das heißt, der aus Schaltern und Verbindungsdrähten gebaut ist -, je ein Bewusstsein dessen erlangen wird, was er tut. Das stärkste Schachprogramm wird nicht wissen, dass es Schach spielt, ebenso wenig wie eine Waschmaschine weiß, dass sie Wäsche wäscht.
  4. Cole, C.: ¬The consciousness' drive : information need and the search for meaning (2018) 0.01
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    Abstract
    What is the uniquely human factor in finding and using information to produce new knowledge? Is there an underlying aspect of our thinking that cannot be imitated by the AI-equipped machines that will increasingly dominate our lives? This book answers these questions, and tells us about our consciousness - its drive or intention in seeking information in the world around us, and how we are able to construct new knowledge from this information. The book is divided into three parts, each with an introduction and a conclusion that relate the theories and models presented to the real-world experience of someone using a search engine. First, Part I defines the exceptionality of human consciousness and its need for new information and how, uniquely among all other species, we frame our interactions with the world. Part II then investigates the problem of finding our real information need during information searches, and how our exceptional ability to frame our interactions with the world blocks us from finding the information we really need. Lastly, Part III details the solution to this framing problem and its operational implications for search engine design for everyone whose objective is the production of new knowledge. In this book, Charles Cole deliberately writes in a conversational style for a broader readership, keeping references to research material to the bare minimum. Replicating the structure of a detective novel, he builds his arguments towards a climax at the end of the book. For our video-game, video-on-demand times, he has visualized the ideas that form the book's thesis in over 90 original diagrams. And above all, he establishes a link between information need and knowledge production in evolutionary psychology, and thus bases his arguments in our origins as a species: how we humans naturally think, and how we naturally search for new information because our consciousness drives us to need it.