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Theme

Information

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Footnote

Die Murmel liefert das Hauptthema des Buchs. Die Seele, das Ich, ist eine Illusion. Es ist eine »seltsame Schleife« (a strange loop), die ihrerseits von einer Unzahl von Schleifen auf einem niedrigeren Niveau erzeugt wird. So kommt es, dass der Klumpen Materie innerhalb unseres Schädels nicht nur sich selbst beobachtet, sondern sich dessen auch bewusst ist. Seltsame, genauer: selbstbezügliche Schleifen faszinieren Hofstadter seit jeher. Er sieht sie überall. Sie sind das Herzstück von Gödels berühmtem Unbeweisbarkeitssatz. Sie lauern in den »Principia Mathematica« von Russell und Whitehead, stets bereit, die Fundamente der Mathematik zu untergraben. Ihre kürzeste Form sind logische Paradoxa wie »Dieser Satz ist falsch« oder die Karte, auf deren einer Seite steht »Der Satz auf der Rückseite ist wahr« und auf der anderen »Der Satz auf der Rückseite ist falsch«. In Kapitel 21 führt er ein verstörendes Gedankenexperiment ein, das auch Thema zahlreicher Sciencefiction-Geschichten ist: Ein Mann wird, wie in »Raumschiff Enterprise«, auf einen fremden Planeten und zurück gebeamt, indem eine Maschine ihn Molekül für Molekül abscannt und die Information an den Zielort übermittelt, wo sie zur Herstellung einer exakten Kopie dieses Menschen dient. Wenn dabei das Original zerstört wird, entsteht kein philosophisches Problem. Wenn es aber erhalten bleibt - oder mit derselben Information zwei Kopien hergestellt werden -, entsteht ein Paar identischer Zwillinge mit identischen Erinnerungen. Ist der so gebeamte Mensch derselbe wie das Original oder ein anderer?

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Content

In which I introduce the ancient mind-body problem, explain why I am on a quest to use reason and empirical inquiry to solve it, acquaint you with Francis Crick, explain how he relates to this quest, make a confession, and end on a sad note -- In which I write about the wellsprings of my inner conflict between religion and reason, why I grew up wanting to be a scientist, why I wear a lapel pin of Professor Calculus, and how I acquired a second mentor late in life -- In which I explain why consciousness challenges the scientific view of the world, how consciousness can be investigated empirically with both feet firmly planted on the ground, why animals share consciousness with humans, and why self-consciousness is not as important as many people think it is -- In which you hear tales of scientist-magicians that make you look but not see, how they track the footprints of consciousness by peering into your skull, why you don't see with your eyes, and why attention and consciousness are not the same -- In which you learn from neurologists and neurosurgeons that some neurons care a great deal about celebrities, that cutting the cerebral cortex in two does not reduce consciousness by half, that color is leached from the world by the loss of a small cortical region, and that the destruction of a sugar cube-sized chunk of brain stem or thalamic tissue leaves you undead -- In which I defend two propositions that my younger self found nonsense--you are unaware of most of the things that go on in your head, and zombie agents control much of your life, even though you confidently believe that you are in charge -- In which I throw caution to the wind, bring up free will, Der ring des Nibelungen, and what physics says about determinism, explain the impoverished ability of your mind to choose, show that your will lags behind your brain's decision, and that freedom is just another word for feeling -- In which I argue that consciousness is a fundamental property of complex things, rhapsodize about integrated information theory, how it explains many puzzling facts about consciousness and provides a blueprint for building sentient machines -- In which I outline an electromagnetic gadget to measure consciousness, describe efforts to harness the power of genetic engineering to track consciousness in mice, and find myself building cortical observatories -- In which I muse about final matters considered off-limits to polite scientific discourse: to wit, the relationship between science and religion, the existence of God, whether this God can intervene in the universe, the death of my mentor, and my recent tribulations.

Footnote

Now it might seem that is a fairly well-defined scientific task: just figure out how the brain does it. In the end I think that is the right attitude to have. But our peculiar history makes it difficult to have exactly that attitude-to take consciousness as a biological phenomenon like digestion or photosynthesis, and figure out how exactly it works as a biological phenomenon. Two philosophical obstacles cast a shadow over the whole subject. The first is the tradition of God, the soul, and immortality. Consciousness is not a part of the ordinary biological world of digestion and photosynthesis: it is part of a spiritual world. It is sometimes thought to be a property of the soul and the soul is definitely not a part of the physical world. The other tradition, almost as misleading, is a certain conception of Science with a capital "S." Science is said to be "reductionist" and "materialist," and so construed there is no room for consciousness in Science. If it really exists, consciousness must really be something else. It must be reducible to something else, such as neuron firings, computer programs running in the brain, or dispositions to behavior. There are also a number of purely technical difficulties to neurobiological research. The brain is an extremely complicated mechanism with about a hundred billion neurons in ... (Rest nicht frei). " [https://www.nybooks.com/articles/2013/01/10/can-information-theory-explain-consciousness/].