Search (7 results, page 1 of 1)

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Abstract

In economics, the principal-agent problem is the difficulty in motivating one party (the agent), to act in the best interests of another (the principal) rather than in his own interests. We consider the example of a journal editor (the principal) wondering whether his or her reviewer (the agent) is recommending rejection of a manuscript because it does not have enough quality to be published or because the reviewer dislikes effort and he/she must work to acquire in-depth knowledge of the content of the manuscript. The reviewer's effort provides him or her with superior information about a manuscript's quality. If this information is not correctly communicated, the reviewer has more information when compared with the journal editor. This inherently leads to an encouragement of moral hazard, where the editor will not know whether the reviewer has done his or her job in accordance to the editor's interest. Prescriptions need to be given as to how the journal editor should control the reviewers to curb self-interest. Besides the associate editors monitoring the peer-review process, incentives can be employed to limit moral hazard on the part of the reviewer. Drawing on agency theory, we examine the incentives motivating the reviewers to expend effort to generate information about the quality of submissions. This model predicts that for reviewers early in their careers, promotion-based incentives may mean there is no need for within-job incentives, but also that within-job rewards for a referee's performance should depend on individual differences in ability and promotion opportunities.

Source

Journal of the Association for Information Science and Technology. 66(2015) no.2, S.297-308

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Abstract

A journal may be considered as having dimension-specific prestige when its score, based on a given journal ranking model, exceeds a threshold value. But a journal has multidimensional prestige only if it is a prestigious journal with respect to a number of dimensions-e.g., Institute for Scientific Information Impact Factor, immediacy index, eigenfactor score, and article influence score. The multidimensional prestige of influential journals takes into account the fact that several prestige indicators should be used for a distinct analysis of the impact of scholarly journals in a subject category. After having identified the multidimensionally influential journals, their prestige scores can be aggregated to produce a summary measure of multidimensional prestige for a subject category, which satisfies numerous properties. Using this measure of multidimensional prestige to rank subject categories, we have found the top scientific subject categories of Web of Knowledge as of 2010.

Source

Journal of the American Society for Information Science and Technology. 63(2012) no.5, S.1017-1029

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Abstract

Here, we develop a theory of the relationship between the reviewer's effort and bias in peer review. From this theory, it follows that journal editors might employ biased reviewers because they shirk less. This creates an incentive for the editor to use monitoring mechanisms (e.g., associate editors supervising the peer review process) that mitigate the resulting bias in the reviewers' recommendations. The supervision of associate editors could encourage journal editors to employ more extreme reviewers. This theory helps to explain the presence of bias in peer review. To mitigate shirking by a reviewer, the journal editor may assign biased referees to generate information about the manuscript's quality and subject the reviewer's recommendations to supervision by a more aligned associate editor.

Source

Journal of the Association for Information Science and Technology. 66(2015) no.10, S.2020-2030

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Abstract

Here, we show a longitudinal analysis of the ranking of the subject areas of Elsevier's Scopus. To this aim, we present three summary measures based on the journal ranking scores for academic journals in each subject area. This longitudinal study allows us to analyze developmental trends over times in different subject areas with distinct citation and publication patterns. We evaluate the relative performance of each subject area by using the overall prestige for the most important journals with ranking score above a given threshold (e.g., in the first quartile) as well as the overall prestige gap for the less important journals with ranking score below a given threshold (e.g., below the top 10 journals). Thus, we propose that it should be possible to study different subject areas by means of appropriate summary measures of the journal ranking scores, which provide additional information beyond analyzing the inequality of the whole ranking-score distribution for academic journals in each subject area. It allows us to investigate whether subject areas with high levels of overall prestige for the first quartile journals also tended to achieve low levels of overall prestige gap for the journals below the top 10.

Source

Journal of the American Society for Information Science and Technology. 62(2011) no.10, S.2013-2023

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Abstract

We introduce a novel methodology for mapping academic institutions based on their journal publication profiles. We believe that journals in which researchers from academic institutions publish their works can be considered as useful identifiers for representing the relationships between these institutions and establishing comparisons. However, when academic journals are used for research output representation, distinctions must be introduced between them, based on their value as institution descriptors. This leads us to the use of journal weights attached to the institution identifiers. Since a journal in which researchers from a large proportion of institutions published their papers may be a bad indicator of similarity between two academic institutions, it seems reasonable to weight it in accordance with how frequently researchers from different institutions published their papers in this journal. Cluster analysis can then be applied to group the academic institutions, and dendrograms can be provided to illustrate groups of institutions following agglomerative hierarchical clustering. In order to test this methodology, we use a sample of Spanish universities as a case study. We first map the study sample according to an institution's overall research output, then we use it for two scientific fields (Information and Communication Technologies, as well as Medicine and Pharmacology) as a means to demonstrate how our methodology can be applied, not only for analyzing institutions as a whole, but also in different disciplinary contexts.

Source

Journal of the American Society for Information Science and Technology. 63(2012) no.11, S.2328-2340

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Abstract

Adverse selection occurs when a firm signs a contract with a potential worker but his/her key skills are still not known at that time, which leads the employer to make a wrong decision. In this article, we study the example of adverse selection of reviewers when a potential referee whose ability is his private information faces a finite sequence of review processes for several scholarly journals, one after the other. Our editor's problem is to design a system that guarantees that each manuscript is reviewed by a referee if and only if the reviewer's ability matches the review's complexity. As is typically the case in solving problems of adverse selection in agency theory, the journal editor offers a menu of contracts to the potential referee, from which the reviewer chooses the contract that is best for him given his ability. The optimal contract will be the one that provides the right incentives to match the complexity of the review and the ability of the reviewer. The payment of contracts is made through a proportional increment of the reviewer factor, which measures the importance of reviewers to their field.

Source

Journal of the Association for Information Science and Technology. 66(2015) no.6, S.1252-1262

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Source

Journal of the Association for Information Science and Technology. 66(2015) no.1, S.117-127